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Toward a Coherent Approach
to Tort Immunity in Judicially Mandated
Family Court Services
BY NAT STERN* & KAREN OEHME**
C hild custody litigation is a notorious emotional and legal morass.
Its problems are exacerbated in high-conflict cases, those ten
to twenty percent of disputes' that consume a "wildly disproportion-
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law.
*" J.D., Florida State University, Program Director of the Clearinghouse on
Supervised Visitation in the Institute for Family Violence Studies at Florida State
University School of Social Work. The Clearinghouse provides technical and legal
assistance to Florida's supervised visitation programs and serves as an international
resource on supervised access issues for centers, legislatures, and the courts.
' Family court cases are the "largest and fastest growing segment of state court
civil caseloads." AM. BAR ASS'N [hereinafter ABA], UNIFIED FAMILY COURTS: A
PROGRESS REPORT 7 (1998) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT]. Domestic relation
cases represent twenty-five percent of all civil filings. Id. (citing ABA, AN AGENDA
FOR JUSTICE: ABA PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL AND CIVIL JUSTICE ISSUES 5 (1996)).
Because of the differing definitions involved, empirical determinations of the exact
number of high-conflict families have not been made. Commentators estimate,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ate"2 amount of court resources and constitute a "major social, economic,
and public health problem."3 While researchers have not adopted a uniform
definition of parental conduct characterizing high-conflict custody cases,
oft-cited behaviors include mutual distrust, intense anger, blame, and
refusal to cooperate concerning the needs of their children.4 These and
other volatile parental behaviors,' combined with eagerness to pursue
repetitive litigation,6 have led courts to reexamine traditional models for
family dispute resolution and to identify components necessary to reduce
conflict.
however, that ten to twenty percent of the divorcing population can be classified
as high-conflict. See, e.g., ELEANORE. MACOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING
THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 140 (1992) (noting that ten
percent of couples in authors' study experienced "substantial" conflict, and fifteen
percent reported "intense" conflict). In reviewing the existing literature, Johnston
and Roseby estimate that "about one fourth of all divorcing couples with children
have considerable difficulty completing the legal divorce without extensive
litigation"; perhaps one fifth of families have "intractable" disputes and relitigate
custody issues after divorce. JANET R. JOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE
NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND
HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE 4 (1997). Canadian
authorities estimate that the numbers are similar in Canada. See Special Joint Com-
mittee of the Canadian Parliament on Joint Custody and Access, For the Sake of
the Children, Chapter 5, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/36/1/SJCA/studies/
reports/sjcarp02/12-Chl-e.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
'Andrew Schepard, Canada's Re-Examination of Its Child Custody System:
A Model?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1999, at 3; see also Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan
Lippman, New York State Unified Court System: Family Justice Program, 36 FAM.
& CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 144, 144 (1998) (noting that the "skyrocketing
caseloads-particularly significant in the areas of termination of parental rights,
adoption, custody and visitation, child support, paternity, and neglect and abuse-
are not likely to diminish").
' Thomas E. Schacht, Prevention Strategies To Protect Professionals and
Families Involved in High-Conflict Divorce, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 565,
565 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional
Partnerships with the Court on Behalf of High-Conflict Divorcing Families and
Their Children: Who Needs What Kind ofHelp?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
453, 455 (2000) [hereinafter Johnston, Building Partnerships].
5 Other characteristics include allegations of abuse and neglect, allegations of
domestic violence, inability or unwillingness to communicate, and interference with
the other parent's right of access to the child. Id.
6 See, e.g., Sarah H. Ramsey, Rep., The Wingspread Report and Action Plan:
High Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children, 39 FAM. CT.
REV. 146, 146 (2001).
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We believe that a missing element in most discussions about child
custody litigation and the new court models is the option of affording
greater legal protection to those who provide the essential components of
conflict reduction. The protections that currently exist on a fragmented
continuum--granting judges absolute immunity from civil suit, and some
but not other professionals and para-professionals qualified immunity7
---represent a patchwork that ignores recent trends in court-directed
services and threatens to undermine crucial assistance to divided families.
This Article recommends that a more consistent and reasoned system of
statutory immunities replace the current arrangement. This system would
reflect recognition that the expanded role of courts in response to the public
health threat of high-conflict families calls for a commensurate expansion
in the scope of immunities available to those who assist courts in the
reduction of conflict. By dispelling the specter of unwarranted suits by
vindictive parents against providers of court-mandated services, states
would enhance the capacity of the emerging family court model to perform
its most vital function: protecting the best interest of the child.
Part I of the Article offers an overview of the dynamics of high-conflict
cases.' Part H surveys the range of protections currently available to various
participants in the resolution of these cases.9 Part 1I proposes a framework
for determining the degree of immunity to which a participant should be
entitled.'" Part IV then applies that framework to the example of supervised
visitation programs, for which the national trend is the development of
standards of practice." Once such standards have crystallized, we argue,
these programs' staff, interns, and community workers should receive
protection from civil liability" similar to the protections offered to others
who serve children and families in crisis.
I. THE NATURE OF HIGH-CONFLICT CASES
Although courts have not embraced a formal definition of a "high-
conflict" custody case, 3 judges, lawyers, and mental health professionals
7 See infra Part II.
S See infra notes 13-46 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 47-175 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 176-209 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 210-301 and accompanying text.
12 Consideration of potential criminal liability lies beyond the scope of this
Article.
3 Nor is it necessary, in our view, to formalize a definition. The law is replete
with terms that serve useful purposes but are considered not susceptible to precise
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apparently believe that they "know it when they see it."' 4 One researcher
believes that a salient feature of high-conflict couples is their "enmeshment
derive[d] from their inability to separate and realistically grieve the loss of
the marriage relationship."' 5 The intense rage and bitterness that character-
ize some couples' entrenched disputes lead outsiders to ask what these
parents are fighting about. One answer includes:
1. Profound mistrust of [the] ex-spouse's parenting skills, which
frequently includes allegations and accusations of abuse, mistrust, and
poor judgment.
2. Parenting time and access to the children.
3. Behavior problems that the children are displaying and [the issue
of] who is to blame for these problems.
4. Being disparaged by the other parent to the point of being
convinced that the children are being "poisoned" or "brainwashed."'
16
definition. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002) (forbidding
"combination[s]... in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states");
21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1)(B) (2002) (authorizing Secretary of Food and Drug
Administration to institute multiple proceedings for misbranded food or drug where
Secretary has probable cause to believe article is "dangerous to health"); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (forbidding classifications penalizing
constitutional right to travel "unless shown to be necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest"), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
" Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(stating of hard-core pornography that "I know it when I see it"). Four researchers
from the Department of Pediatrics at East Tennessee State University distributed
to professionals who deal with family conflict in their work a questionnaire on
these respondents' perceptions of divorce. In a section asking whether guidelines
were needed to define high-conflict divorce, those respondents "who did not
recommend guidelines believed it is not possible to define high conflict divorce,
that it can change over time, and it is already easily determined." H. Patrick Stem
et al., Professionals' Perceptions of Divorce Involving Children, 22 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 593, 597 (2000).
"5 Johnston, Building Partnerships, supra note 4, at 456. Johnston and
Vivienne Roseby write:
In sum, high-conflict parents are identified by multiple, overlapping
criteria: high rates of litigation and relitigation, high degrees of anger and
distrust, incidents of verbal abuse, intermittent physical aggression, and
ongoing difficulty communicating about and cooperating over the care of
their children at least two to three years following the separation.
JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 1, at 5.
16 MITCHELL BARIS ET AL., WORKING WITH HIGH CONFLICT FAMILIES OF
DIVORCE: A GUIDE FOR PROFESSIONALS 15, 16 (2001).
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Researchers disagree whether the term "high-conflict family" should
include cases involving domestic violence or whether, because of the
erroneous implication of mutual blame, the term should instead be limited
to repetitive litigation. 7
Regardless of the specific definition, however, the psychological
impact of high conflict and domestic violence on the children can be
devastating. There seems to be considerable consensus on the effect of
high-conflict cases: chronic post-separation conflict "seriously harm[s] the
children involved."' 8 Certainly the impact of domestic violence on children
is well-documented.' 9 Children whose parents have been embroiled in
extended custody litigation have reportedly shown increased aggression,
heightened depression, somatic complaints, and maladaptive ways of
coping in interpersonal relationships." The more overt the conflict, the
more troubled the children are likely to be.2 Several authors have gone so
" See Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Dis-
putes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management,
22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 395, 413 (2000) [hereinafter Schepard, Evolving
Judicial Role]. As many researches have explained, domestic violence--while
involving conflict-is about the control and abuse by a batterer, and the parties are
not on equal footing. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 82 (1996) (noting that the typical batterer uses violence
to meet needs for power and control over others: "[t]heir actions are often fueled
by stereotypical sex-role expectations for 'their' women"). For this reason, the term
high-conflict itself must be qualified, to avoid blaming victims of domestic
violence. Still, it is well-established that batterers often seek to control their victims
through the court system: fathers who batter the mother are twice as likely to
contest custody as non-batterers. Id. at 40. Battering fathers are even more likely
to dispute custody when the family includes sons. Id.
18 Ramsey, supra note 6, at 146.
'9 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 17, at 21 ("A substantial body of
research suggests that experiencing or observing violence in the home may be the
start of a lifelong pattern of using violence to exert social control over others
...."). Victims of domestic violence, of course, should not be blamed for their
batterers' behavior.
20 Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children
ofJoint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576, 588-89
(1989).
2 Id. There also seems to be a gender-based difference in the impact of post-
divorce conflict, with girls suffering more emotional and behavioral trauma, and
boys experiencing disruptions in social competence and school performance. Id.
at 589.
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far as to contend that children in high-conflict custody cases may suffer
psychological abuse, and have recommended that clinical criteria be
modified to reflect the high likelihood of child abuse among this popula-
tion.2
The potential irreparable damage to children of chronically litigious
parents may perpetuate conflict in the next generation, producing adults
who cannot properly parent or function well in society.23 Alarmed by the
22 H. Patrick Stem et al., Battered-Child Syndrome: Is It a Paradigm for a
Child of Embattled Divorce?, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 335, 336 (2000).
The authors suggest developing a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual format to
define criteria of parental behavior raising suspicions of child psychological abuse.
Id. at 348. The authors offer the following suggestions for major and minor criteria
to be considered. Major criteria would include the following:
1. A parent initiates recurrent court hearings especially to contest
custody, visitation, and/or finances.
2. A parent engages in dangerous behavior that threatens the physical
safety of the child.
4. A parent has a history of physical and/or sexual abuse and/or violent
behavior which occurred before or after the divorce.
5. There is concrete objective evidence of a parent trying to purposely
turn a child against another parent, stepparent, or sibling.
8. A parent kidnaps a child.
Id. app. III, at 353. Minor criteria would include the following:
1. Parents unable to settle their divorce without a court hearing.
2. A parent threatens physical and/or emotional violence to other family
members.
4. A parent refuses to engage in an evaluation or therapy....
5. A parent consistently has a child unavailable or significantly late for
the exchange at visitation.
Id. app. II, at 353. While we are sympathetic to the frustration and concern that
obviously motivated the authors' provocative proposals, our Article does not
support the use of a "high-conflict syndrome," because it does not sufficiently
address domestic violence. We believe that one of the problems with the use of a
"high-conflict syndrome" is that it could potentially be invoked to punish domestic
violence victims by claiming that they are failing to protect their children who
witness the violence of the abusive parent. For a discussion of the problem with
allegations of a "failure to protect" as a means of child maltreatment, see Randy H.
Magen, In the Best Interests ofBattered Women: Reconceptualizing Allegations of
Failure to Protect, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT 127, 128 (1999) (arguing that such
a definition is dangerous to battered women, and noting that in at least four states,
child neglect has been expanded to include witnessing domestic violence).
23 BARIS ET AL., supra note 16, at 15-16.
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devastation caused by acrimonious divorce litigation and forced to find
legal and judicial resolutions to the complex personal and social problems
presented in custody disputes, the courts and family bar have proposed (and
in some instances enacted) several solutions aimed at the reduction of
conflict. These efforts, as one author has noted, have transformed the
judge's role from fault finder to conflict manager.24 As Professor Chayes
argued a generation ago, "[O]ur traditional conception of adjudication...
provide[s] an increasingly unhelpful, indeed misleading framework for
assessing either the workability or the legitimacy of the roles of judge and
court within this model."25 Indeed, if we examine what courts are increas-
ingly doing "in fact" 26 in disputed custody cases, we must acknowledge that
the traditional models of family litigation and immunity protections are
sorely antiquated.
Although there have been many approaches to resolving child custody
disputes, the most comprehensive of these may be the unified family court
movement. This movement "combines the essential elements of traditional
family and juvenile courts into one entity"; it also urges courts to provide
social service resources thought to play a vital role in resolving families'
problems .27 These courts are "designed to dispense therapeutic justice in an
effort to address the personal and social issues that drive families into
court, 28 and they have many "opportunities to intervene in the lives of
individual family members. 29
The unified family court system recognizes that the most distressed
families are those involved in overlapping litigation. For example, a
husband and wife in a protracted custody and divorce action may also be
accused of abuse or neglect by the juvenile protection system, and their
children may be involved in a juvenile delinquency action. In order to
24 Schepard, Evolving Judicial Role, supra note 17, at 400.
25 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1281, 1282 (1976). Professor Chayes was discussing the changes occurring
in public law litigation. We believe, however, that his observations on the appro-
priateness of a revised model to accommodate an expanded judicial role apply to
the family court setting as well.
26 Id. Chayes quotes Holmes's admonition to focus on" 'what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious.' "Id. at 1281-82 (quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)).
2 7 ABA, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8; see also Kaye & Lippman,
supra note 2, at 144 (arguing that unified family courts are more responsive to
troubled families).
28 Stephen J. Cribari, Unified Family Courts: Therapeutic Power and Judicial
Authority, UFC CHRON. (ABA Communities, Family & Justice System Project),
Spring 1999, at 1.29 Id. at7.
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reduce the fragmentation that results from several courts' dealing with the
same family, the unified family court system seeks to coordinate all judicial
intervention.3" In some views, the central principle of the unified family
court is that a single judge handles all matters relating to a particular
family.3' More than just case management, though, the unified family court
approach32 includes "support teams" providing comprehensive services for
children and families.33 These teams screen and evaluate families, and link
them to court and community resources to deal with substance abuse,
violence, mental health issues, and other impediments to a couple's
restructuring of their relationship.34 In describing why litigants' traditional
goals--enforcing rights and pursuing remedies 35-- are not suited to family
courts, the president of the Atlanta Bar Association endorsed the unified
family court approach:
Families are not business entities. Their needs are not best served by a
system that is adversarial in nature and designed to produce a winner and
a loser .... Where the needs of families are involved, our community
desperately needs a system that will help them solve their underlying
problems, not just one where competition between litigants is the driving
force .... 
36
30 But cf. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, The Challenge to Rural States of Pro-
cedural Reform in High Conflict Custody Cases, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv.
357 (2000) (arguing that rural courts may face a more difficult time than their
urban counterparts in enacting reform).
31 Andrew Schepard, Introduction to the Unified Family Courts, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 16, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Schepard, Introduction].
32 For a state-by-state survey of family courts, listing those jurisdictions that
have adopted a unified family court approach, see ABA, PROGRESS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 13-38.
" See Schepard, Introduction, supra note 31, at 3. However, "there is no
'cookie-cutter' definition of a unified family court." UNIFIED FAM. CHRON. (ABA
Communities, Families & Justice System Project), July 1998, at 1.
34 See Schepard, Introduction, supra note 31, at 3. The ABA has endorsed the
availability of such services to unified family courts. See ABA, PROGRESS REPORT,
supra note 1, at 10. In addition, the ABA has recommended that the office of the
family court administrator serve as a liaison to agencies that provide services such
as counseling and mediation, and that unified family courts include community
outreach programs such as parenting classes and programs addressing sexual abuse
and alcohol and drug addiction. Id.
35 Deborah B. Zink, Family Court: It Just Makes So Much Sense, ATLANTA
LAW., Aug. 1997, reprinted in UNIFIED FAM. CHRON. (ABA Communities,
Families & Justice System Project), Aug. 1997, at 2, 3.
36 Id.
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Solutions besides the "one-stop shopping" approach37 have been
promoted to deal with high-conflict families.3 Some of these call for
enhanced training for judges, attorneys, and mental health professionals on
the dynamics and effects of high conflict and violence, while others
advocate an array of special services that should be "available to all
families, without regard to income" in order to identify and resolve
conflicts effectively.39 As in the unified family court model, these programs
and services include alternative dispute resolution (such as mediation and
collaborative law), custody evaluations, parenting monitors, coordinators
to manage chronic disputes, trained children's representatives, individual
and group mental health treatment, and supervised visitation.4" The
common objectives of these models, summarized in the American Bar
Association's ("ABA's") Wingspread Report, are to "reduce conflict,
assure physical security, provide adequate support services to reduce harm
to children, and enable the family to manage its own affairs."41 This
approach is consistent with the trend toward "therapeutic jurisprudence,"
defined by the concept's co-founders42 as "an interdisciplinary approach to
law that builds on the basic insight that law is a social force that has
inevitable . .. consequences for the mental health and psychological
functioning of those it affects." '43 The concept may be best known as a
means to describe the criminal justice system's efforts to seek therapeutic
solutions--such as treatment and therapy-in drug court cases.' Commen-
31 See Stephanie Domitrovich, Utilizing an Effective Economic Approach to
Family Court: A Proposalfor a Statutory Unified Family Court in Pennsylvania,
37 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 2 (1998) (advocating the "one-stop convenient shopping"
approach as efficient and sensible).
38 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 6, at 152 (discussing in depth the
interdisciplinary recommendations proposed for the legal and mental health
systems to reduce the impact of high-conflict custody cases on children).
39 Id. Ramsey supports the latter approach.
' Id. Other writers have added substance abuse monitoring, batterers' treat-
ment programs, and victim's advocacy to the list. See, e.g., Johnston, Building
Partnerships, supra note 4, at 478.
"' Ramsey, supra note 6, at 147.
42 DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1991); see also PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
HELPING PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter PRACTICING
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE].
43 Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Juris-
prudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, in PRACTICING
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 42, at 7.
4 See, e.g., David Shichor & Dale Sechrest, Introduction, J. DRUG ISSUES,
Winter 2001, at 5 (stating that drug courts are premised on the idea that supervised
substance abuse treatment may form a "criminal justice alternative to traditional
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tators, however, have praised the application of therapeutic jurisprudence
and its "healing potential"45 in family court, and indeed, in cases across the
entire legal spectrum.46
11. EXISTING PROTECTIONS
The models championed by the ABA and states that have adopted court
reform in family law endorse judicial reliance on a "team approach" and
encourage "outreach to social services providers and volunteers."47 These
providers include an entire cadre of professionals and para-professionals
who ideally collaborate with the court to address disputes of high-conflict
families and perform neutral services that courts deem necessary.48 Some
believe that the court should be a "sparkplug for mobilizing private sector
and volunteer resources"49 to help troubled families. Apparently, it does
"take a village"5 to help courts assist some parents in resolving addiction
punishment"); see also Jeffrey S. Tauber, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Holds
Potentialfor Drug Offenders, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Dec. 24,2001,
at 5 (discussing the challenges of applying therapeutic jurisprudence in criminal
settings).
" Elizabeth Schwartz, Book Review, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Law as a Helping Profession, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 66; see also In re The Report
of the Family Court Steering Comm'n, 794 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2001). This court
adopts the recommendations of the Family Court Steering Committee, which states:
"Therapeutic justice should be a key part of the family court process. Therapeutic
justice is a process that attempts to address the family's interrelated legal and
nonlegal problems to produce a result that improves the family's functioning. The
process should empower families through skills development, assist them to resolve
their own disputes, provide access to appropriate services, and offer a variety of
dispute resolution forums where the family can resolve problems without additional
emotional trauma." Id. app. at 537.
46 See WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 42, at x; see also Stolle et al., supra note
43, at 10 (advocating therapeutic jurisprudence in business planning law and elder
law, as well as family law). But see Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least
Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2088
(2002) (arguing that "[t]he therapeutic jurisprudence movement requires us to
become the kind of involved, hands-on, right-thinking, sure-footed activists that the
judicial branch was specifically designed to exclude").47 ABA, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
48 Mitchell Baris and his co-authors propose a "Parenting Coordinator," a term
which would "include all those individuals who work to help parents in high
conflict resolve their impasses so life can move on and their children can be
reasonably free from stress and anxiety." BARIS ET AL., supra note 16, at 10.
41 Schepard, Introduction, supra note 31, at 3.
50 See, e.g., Patricia Barnes, It May Take a Village... : Or a Specialized Court
to Address Family Problems, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 23; see generally HILLARY
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and dysfunction and to work together to create new parenting skills. These
stewards of at-risk children strive to answer the court's call to help parents
forge a constructive partnership in an ongoing relationship fundamentally
altered by events such as separation, divorce, remarriage, and blended
families, and by the potentially enormous challenges that these changes
create.
Inherent in these collaborative measures is an admonition against
measures that could increase conflict5 and a call for "holding all parties
[in disputed custody cases] accountable for their contributions to the con-
flict."52 Largely left out of the bar's equation, however, is a call for a
legislatively created, cohesive scheme to protect those very people on
whom judges will depend to help reduce conflict.53 The need for such
protection arises from the nature of the "perpetual war zone"54 in which the
disputing parents--called "hostility junkies" by one commentator 55-- can
quickly focus their substantial animosity on other participants in the
dispute.
RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE, AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH
Us (1996).
5' Ramsey, supra note 6, at 147. As the preamble of the Wingspread report
states,
High-conflict cases can emanate from any (or all) of the participants in a
custody dispute-parents who have not managed their conflict
responsibly; attorneys whose representation of their clients adds
additional and unnecessary conflict to the proceedings; mental health
professionals whose interaction with parents, children, attorneys, or the
court system exacerbates the conflict; or court systems in which
procedures, delays, or errors cause unfairness, frustration, or facilitate the
continuation of the conflict.
Id. at 146; see also Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in
High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 518 (2001) (listing
"numerous improvements that could reduce conflict," including "hold[ing] all
parties accountable for their contributions to the conflict").
52 Elrod, supra note 51; see also Ramsey, supra note 6, at 147.
53 This Article does not address the issue of reporting child abuse. Most states
have created statutes that provide immunity from liability to persons required to
report child abuse, unless the report was false and the person knew it was false.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (2001).
14 Schepard, Evolving Judicial Role, supra note 17, at 418.
55 Ann Milne & Jay Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce Mediation:
An Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (Ann Milne &
Jay Folberg eds., 1988) (quoting Hugh Mclsaac, Mediation of Child Custody and
Visitation Disputes, Conference Remarks, Vallambrosa Retreat, Menlo Park, Cal.
(Sept. 1981)).
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We illustrate theproblem throughout with afictitious couple 6: Mr. and
16 Although Mr. and Mrs. Smith's case is purely fictitious, the couple's
disputes are not unprecedented in case law. The following is a short sampling of
facts alleged in family court cases. G.T.R. v. UD.R., 632 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1993) was a case involving modification of a divorce judgment granting
custody. The father alleged that the mother's boyfriend, who became her husband,
sexually abused the son. Id. at 496. The father threatened the mother, suggesting
a desire for retribution. Id. The father accused the mother of child and animal
abuse. Id. The father reported to police that the child was taken from daycare,
sexually abused, and then returned to daycare. Id. The police investigated and
charges were dropped. Id. Criminal charges resulting from another accusation of
sexual abuse were dismissed by the grand jury. Id. The father sent a letter to a
United States Senator, the Governor of Alabama, and the Alabama Attorney
General regarding his accusations of sexual abuse. Id. Testimony indicated that the
father had a violent temper, carried a gun, had a history of alcohol abuse, had
received psychological counseling, and was taking antidepressants. Id. at 496-97.
The father assaulted the mother in 1991. Id. at 497. The father filed a complaint
with military officials that the mother had threatened his life. Id. In another case,
Winalski v. Winalski, No. FA 900439823, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 367 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 1999), the court concluded, after an eight-year battle, that "[t]he
parents of these children are responsible for making the lives of these children very
unhappy, immature and anxiety-ridden, and [the parents] are now reaping the
damaged fruits of their labors." Id. at * 18. The mother called the police several
times, claiming harassment by the father. Id. The mother alleged that she needed
the court to set boundaries because of the father's violence, gun possession, and
inappropriate behavior concerning her safety. Id. The court noted:
The [couple's] multiple motions, and earlier allegations of sexual abuse,
physical abuse within the marital relationship, emotional abuse, and
claims of subversion of the father-child relationship track the most
compelling and difficult cases which come before the court in family
matters. The court cannot resurrect the lives of these children, and the
demeanor of the parties and at least one of their spouses in the courtroom
proved their complete unwillingness to hear each others' concerns and
work toward collaboration or resolution. These children are being
emotionally abused on a continuum by their parents.
Id. at *2-*3. InLori WC. v. Franklin H.D., No. CN93-10367, 1999 Del. Farn. Ct.
LEXIS 94 (Del. Fain. Ct. Feb. 3, 1999), the father challenged the mother's
allowing their child to see R-rated movies and her leaving the child home alone at
night. Id. at * 13. The father provided testimony that the mother's behavior was fine
while she had a boyfriend, but that there were other times when she "goes off' and
lost control both in person and on the phone. Id. at *20-*21. The father tape
recorded eight different calls over a period of one and a half hours; the court
characterized the calls as suggestive of"psychological distress." Id. at *2 1-*22. At
times the daughter could be heard crying in the background. Id. at *21. The father
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Mrs. Smith. Mr. Smith, after five years of marriage, has filed for divorce
and alleges that Mrs. Smith is unfit to maintain residency of the couple's
young children, Jessie, age two, and John, age four. He contends that she
is an alcoholic and has used excessive corporal punishment-resulting in
bruising and scarring-which amounts to child abuse understate law. Mrs.
Smith denies the accusation, and alleges that Mr. Smith is a recreational
drug user who has suffered from bouts of severe depression during the
marriage. Mrs. Smith files for temporary sole custody of the children.
During the hearing on her motion, Mrs. Smith accuses Mr. Smith of having
an affair with her best friend. The judge denies Mrs. Smith 's motion for
relief and notes that she suspects Mrs. Smith of trying to punish her hus-
alleged that the mother called him a loser, alcoholic, and drug abuser in front of the
child. Id. at *22. The mother raised the issue of the father's sleeping in the same
bed as the child, keeping her dependent on him, and calling the child his "little
wife"; she also asserted that the child drew a picture of the father naked after he
took her into a male locker room at the YMCA. Id. at * 13-* 14. The mother argued
that the father's home was not as appropriate as her home, because the father lived
with his mother and stepfather. Id. at * 12. The mother further accused the father
of being jealous of her time with the child and of showing up at different locations
during her time with the child. Id. at *20. Schweinberg v. Click, 627 So. 2d 548
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), involved a mother's accusation that the father allowed
his mother to belittle the couple's son, who had cerebral palsy, and to pull his hair
and hit him. Id. at 551. The mother accused the father of preventing her from
visiting their children in retaliation for her reporting the episode to the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Id. The mother further alleged that the father
threatened to place the couple's son in an institution and to prevent the mother from
seeing the children. Id. In response, the father asserted that he refused overnight
visitation only because the mother's current husband was a felon convicted of lewd
and lascivious behavior on a female child and had been under fifteen years of court
supervision. Id. As a final example, Dickison v. Dickison, 874 P.2d 695 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1994), dealt with a child who had received psychiatric treatment. The parents
were then warned that the child would probably develop a "severe character
disorder" if he were not protected from the legal and emotional turmoil resulting
from a custody battle. Id. at 696. Nevertheless, the battle only escalated. The father
accused the mother of not providing adequate food, clothing, and supervision, and
frequently apologized to the son for who his mother was. Id. The child mistreated
the mother and continued to accuse her of sexual abuse. Id. Evidence indicated that
the father instigated and encouraged this behavior in the child. Id. The mother
accused the father of trying to destroy her relationship with the child. Id. These
allegations are extremely troubling to courts, who must sift through them and
determine their validity. Such a herculean task requires a deep understanding of
complex issues, including sexual abuse, substance abuse, domestic violence, and
mental illness.
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band by keeping the children from him. The judge orders temporary joint
custody. Mrs. Smith files a civil complaint pro se against the judge.
A. Judicial Immunity
In bringing an action against the judge, Mrs. Smith will immediately
encounter the common law doctrine of judicial immunity, which protects
judges in every state.57 Parents involved in protracted custody disputes are
a famously unhappy group. Some researchers postulate that parents
embroiled in custody litigation are narcissistic, may have personality
disorders or blaming orientations," and were dysfunctional prior to the
separation. 9 When judges make decisions that parents feel are unfair,
unreasonable, and damaging to themselves and their children, the parents
may first direct their anger toward those judges. They quickly discover,
however, that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity,' which has long
protected judges from civil suits,6 will frustrate their intentions. Absolute
judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate
assessment of damages,62 andjudges maybe protected even if their acts are
corrupt or intentionally harmful.63 When judges render decisions in their
judicial capacity-even conspiring with a party to violate another party's
" For a thorough treatment of judicial immunity, see Jeffrey M. Shaman,
Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1
(1990).
58 See, e.g., Sanford M. Portnoy, Effectively Representing the Unreasonable
Client, FAM. L. SEC. COMMENTATOR (Fla. Bar Ass'n, Tallahassee, Fla.), Sept.
2003, at 22.
59 Johnston, Building Partnerships, supra note 4, at 456.
6 See Shaman, supra note 57, at 5 (stating that "judicial immunity protects all
judges, from the lowest to the highest court, so long as they are performing a
judicial act that is not clearly beyond their jurisdiction").
61 See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872) (noting that
although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may occasionally result, there are
compelling policy reasons for judicial immunity).
62 See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam). Waco, a public
defender, alleged that Judge Mireles violated his constitutional rights when Mireles
ordered the police to seize Waco forcibly and to bring Waco into the courtroom
after he failed to appear for the calling of the judicial calendar. Id. at 10. Judicial
immunity was upheld. Id. at 13.63 See, e.g., Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264 (5th Cir.) (holding thatjudge
was immune from suit by plaintiff who alleged that judge had participated in
altering the transcript and had wrongfully cancelled his bond), modified by 583
F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled in part by 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979).
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constitutional rights-they are protected from suit, unless they act in the
"clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter."' Thus, when an
Alabama judge settled a dispute over possession of the marital home in the
husband's favor on condition of the husband's undergoing a vasectomy, the
judge was held immune from the husband's suit.65
The egregiousness of any particular case notwithstanding, the rationale
for judicial immunity is grounded in sound public policy. The Supreme
Court in 1872 enumerated these reasons in Bradley v. Fisher.66 A judge
must be "free to act upon his own convictions without fear of personal
consequences";67 the competing interests in a case before a court make it
likely that the losing party may be overly willing to ascribe malevolent
motives to the judge;68 judges faced with the prospect of defending
damages actions and satisfying money judgments will be driven to wasteful
self-protection and may be less inclined to administer justice;69 alternative
remedies such as appeal and impeachment reduce the need for private
rights of action against judges;70 and the ease of alleging bad faith will
make qualified "good-faith immunity" virtually worthless because judges
will be constantly forced to defend their motives in court. 7' When
considered against the backdrop of difficult, emotionally volatile, and
protracted custody cases, these considerations point to the continued
vitality of judicial immunity today.7
" See, e.g., Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 943 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding
that, because the judge had jurisdiction, he was immune from suit despite allegedly
conspiring with a father prior to dependency hearing to declare the child depen-
dent). But see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that judicial
immunity did not bar defendants' claim for injunctive relief against judge for
wrongful incarceration and violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); David
R. Cohen, Note, Judicial Malpractice Insurance? The Judiciary Responds to the
Loss of Absolute Judicial Immunity, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 267, 280 (2000)
(noting that injunctive relief against judges, as well as assessment of attorney's
fees, are exceptions to judicial immunity).
65 Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
"Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 335.
67 d. at 347.
681 d. at 348.
69 Id. at 349.
70 Id. at 350.
711d. at 354.
72 But see K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-first
Century, 39 How. L.J. 95, 99 (1995) (proposing a system of personal liability for
judges).
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In cases subsequent to Bradley v. Fisher, the United States Supreme
Court73 and several lower federal courts74 extended the notion of common-
law immunity to several other participants in the judicial process, whose
functions were defined as "integral" 75 to that process. State courts fol-
lowed the federal example, and granted judicial or quasi-judicial immunity
to non-judicial court participants including psychologists, child protective
workers, and social workers. 6 In those cases, state courts used the federal
function analysis 77 to find that some participants who were not governmen-
tal employees nonetheless constituted agents of the court.
71 See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,269 (1993) (examining the
function the judge serves in the situation when determining whether to extend
judicial immunity); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (stating that
"immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the
person to whom it attaches"); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810 (1982)
(emphasizing the "'functional' approach" to immunity law); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (stating that a federal hearing officer is "'functionally
comparable' to... a judge").
71 See, e.g., Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 (8th Cir. 1987)
(extending absolute immunity to a psychologist, guardian ad litem ("GAL"), and
attorney who were appointed to fulfill quasi-judicial responsibilities under court
direction in a child abuse case); Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69, 70 (6th Cir. 1985)
(upholding the District Court's decision to apply the function test and to grant the
court-appointed mediator absolute quasi-judicial immunity); In re Scott County
Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1174 (D. Minn. 1987) (granting qualified
quasi-judicial immunity to child protective services caseworkers), aff'd sub nom.
Meyers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989).
75 Myers, 810 F.2d at 1467.
76 See, e.g., Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1093 (Alaska 1994) (finding
court-appointed psychologist in custody dispute to be protected by absolute quasi-
judicial immunity); Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173, 177-79 (Haw. 1981) (deeming
psychiatrist appointed by the court as protected by absolute judicial immunity for
performing functions essential to the court process); Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 569
A.2d 872, 880-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding psychologist, adoption resource
center, and child placement review board to be protected by quasi-judicial
immunity in child custody evaluation dispute), aff'd sub nom. A.D. v. Franco, 687
A.2d 748 (N.J. App. Div. 1993).
77 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (noting that "the common
law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all
persons--governmental or otherwise-who were integral parts of the judicial
process"). The right to quasi-judicial immunity depends on the actor's connection
to the judicial process. The court in Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir.
1984) extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity to psychiatrists and social
workers involved in terminating parental rights, emphasizing that the defendants
served functions integral to the judicial process. Id. at 1458.
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As described in the following section, some professionals involved in
disputed custody cases have enjoyed protection conferred by courts on an
ad hoc basis or by state legislatures that have by statute cloaked these
participants with absolute or qualified quasi-judicial immunity. These
reforms, however, have given rise to two new problems. First, while the
recognition of family conflict and the need for its reduction are constant
and universal,78 only some states have passed immunity statutes for a few
common participants in high-conflict cases. The recent trend is for many
other participants to be called to assist the court with determining the
child's best interest and reducing the family's conflict. For example, courts
and some legislatures have been quick to bestow immunity on participants
such as court-appointed special advocates ("CASAs"), who frequently
come under fire from angry parents.79 At the same time, a host of other
service providers," whose help judges enlist frequently and creatively in
high-conflict cases,8' still enjoy no statutory orjudicially created immunity.
Secondly, leaving the immunity decisions to judges, who must use the
function analysis test on a case-by-case basis only after parents file vin-
78 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 6, at 147; see also Leigh Goodmark, From
Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should do for Children in Family
Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 237, 239 (2000) ("It has almost become trite
to declare that violence against women is an epidemic in the United States.").
' See Bluntt v. O'Connor, 737 N.Y.S.2d 471, 479 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal
denied, 98 N.Y.2d 605 (2002) (holding that absolute immunity was necessary for
GALs); Falk v. Sadler, 533 S.E.2d 350, 353-54 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding the
guardian immune and stating that "[i]t is the nature of the acts, not simply the status
of the... guardian ad litem, that determines... immunity"). But see Holly Marie
McIntyre, Fleming v. Asbill: South Carolina Guardian Ad Litem not Immune from
Civil Liability, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1711, 1712 (1996) (discussing Fleming v.
Asbill, 42 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 1994), where the court found GALs not to be immune
from a negligence action). For a discussion of GAL and CASA immunities, see
infra Part II.D.
"O We use the example of the supervised visitation and monitored exchange
workers who serve courts in nearly every state, but there are others. The Supervised
Visitation Network's ("SVN") website includes a directory of service providers
listing hundreds of supervised visitation programs across the U.S. and abroad. See
SVN, Directory of Service Providers, at http://www.svnetwork.net/Service
Providers.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2003). We describe supervised visitation at
length in Part IVA of this Article.
8" Therapeutic re-contact clinicians, therapeutic reunification clinicians, and
emergency case stabilizers are a few of the specialized roles mentioned in Lynn M.
Kenney & Diana Vigil, A Lawyer's Guide to Therapeutic Interventions in
Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 629, 637 (1996).
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dictive lawsuits, raises questions about the proper judicial role; as one
judge put it, "[l]aws should be created by legislation, not by litigation. ' 2
In addition, such an ad hoc approach also threatens to overwhelm the
workload of an "already beleaguered judiciary.
8 3
B. Immunity for Mediators: A Spectrum of Standards
The judge presiding in the Smith case orders the couple to mediation
to allow them an opportunity to settle their differences and work out a
mutually agreeableparentingplan. Each parentfiles at least three motions
for relief before the mediation session. Mr. Smith's request to waive
mediation is denied. During a lengthy mediation session, Mr. Smith
becomes enraged at the mediator, accusing her of bias in favor of his wife.
He signs a mediation agreement, but later asserts that he was given
excessively restricted access to their children under the agreement and that
he was coerced to sign the document. Armed with these allegations, he files
a suit against the mediator.8
The basic tenet of domestic relations mediation is that the adversarial
process should not be used to decide questions of marital property division
82 Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 867-68 (Cal. App. Ct. 1990)
(Danielson, J., concurring and dissenting) ("When it is necessary, or desirable, as
a matter of public policy to extend judicial immunity to persons who would
otherwise... not enjoy it the Legislature has the power and the right to do so ....
Profound changes in our laws, such as the majority seek to make, should be forged
in the proven and legitimate crucible of the legislative process.... Laws should be
created by legislation, not by litigation."). The majority had held "that the
justification for giving judicial and quasi-judicial immunity... to court-appointed
persons... [as well as] nonappointed persons ... applies with equal force to these
neutral persons who attempt to resolve disputes." Id. at 858-59.
83 George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Role Duality and the Issue of Immunity for the
Guardian Ad Litem in the District of Columbia, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279, 299
(2002) (arguing that the District of Columbia should create statutory immunity for
GALs).
4 Mediator liability based on accusations of professional negligence arises
under tort law.
Malpractice claims... require proof on four elements: (1) A duty owed
to the participants by the mediator, (2) a breach of the duty by failure to
comply with acceptable standards of practice, (3) damages measurable in
money, and (4) a causal relationship between the failure to exercise an
acceptable standard of practice and the alleged damages.
Jay Folberg, Liability ofDivorce Mediators, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 55, at 345.
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and child custody. 5 Mediation in family court cases, "a process in which
disputing parties select a neutral third party to assist them in reaching a
mutually satisfying agreement,"" is often considered essential for conflict
resolution in child custody cases. 7 Some studies have suggested, however,
that when parties have a history of high personal conflict over low-value
resources or visits with children, mediation may not be successful.88
85 See Carol J. King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce
Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375, 377 (1999):
The adversary system works by emphasizing the differences between the
litigants, and by advancing each litigant's wishes by attacking the merits
of the other's position. In order to work as designed, divorce litigation
actually polarizes the divorcing couple. After trial the adversaries need to
rebuild their relationship so as to remain partners and parents to their
children. This goal is unlikely to be achieved in a system that operates on
the general assumption that the trial courtjudgment actually ends the case,
and also ends the relationship between the disputants, when in fact it does
neither.
See also LENARD MARLOW, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICE IN SEARCH OF A
THEORY 1-8 (1997). For a thorough discussion of mediation in the context of
family disputes, see CONNIE J.A. BECK & BRUCE D. SALES, FAMILY MEDIATION:
FACTS, MYTHS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (2001).
6Kara C. Utzig, Entering the Debate on Spousal Abuse Divorce Mediation:
Safely Managing Divorce Mediation When Domestic Violence Is Discovered, 7
BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 53 (1999).
87 See, e.g., Andrew Kaplan, The Advantages of Mediation in Resolving
Custody Disputes, 23 RUTGERS L. REC. 5, 2 (1999) (explaining that "[m]ediation
is an enticing alternative to litigation when resolving visitation and custody
disputes"); see also Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediation and Divorce:
The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1982, at 26 (touting the
benefits of mediation). But see Kerry Loomis, Comment, Domestic Violence and
Mediation: A Tragic Combination for Victims in California Family Court, 35 CAL.
W. L. REV. 355, 360 (1999) (noting that while mediation is often a sound
alternative to divorce proceedings, most states provide domestic violence victims
with exemptions from compulsory mediation). For a discussion of the reasons to
avoid mediation in domestic violence cases, see Barbara Hart, Gentle Jeopardy:
The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody,
MEDIATION Q., Summer 1990, at 317; and Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 235 (2002).
88 John Wade, Don't Waste My Time on Negotiation and Mediation: This
Dispute Needs a Judge, MEDIATION Q., Spring 2001, at 267. The author argues that
"[i]t may be that the extended conflict is both causal and symptomatic of the
inability to negotiate," and that "[s]uch disputes arguably need to be diagnosed
early and directed toward the bullying style of mediation, med-arb, or an umpire."
Id.
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Conflict itself may provide a "meaning to life" 9 for some litigants; still,
mediation is a "key element of domestic court policy throughout much of
the United States." 90
Along with a nationwide trend toward creating standards governing
mediators' conduct, 9' many states have developed statutory provisions that
grant mediators at least some immunity from civil liability. Even in states
that have adopted immunity for mediators, however, the approach is far
from uniform. In North Carolina, Florida, West Virginia, and Indiana, for
example, mediators enjoy absolute immunity in the same manner and to the
same extent as a family court judge.92 In many other states, legislation
protects mediators with qualified immunity from civil liability.93 Qualified
89/d.
90 Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face of
Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 335, 337 (1999); see also Kaplan, supra note 87, at 5
(explaining that "[m]ediation is an enticing alternative to litigation when resolving
visitation and custody disputes").
9' See generally Bobby Marzine Harges, Mediator Qualifications: The Trend
Toward Professionalization, 1997 BYU L. REV. 687; Dana Shaw, Comment,
Mediation Certification: An Analysis of the Aspects ofMediator Certification and
an Outlook on the Trend of Formulating Qualifications for Mediators, 29 U. TOL.
L. REV. 327 (1998). The American Arbitration Association, the American Bar
Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution collaborated
in developing Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, which are reprinted in
the Journal ofThe NationalAssociation ofAdministrative Law Judges, 17 J. NAT'L
ASs'N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 323 (1997).
92 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 44.107 (West 2002). Although a civil action may not
be brought against a mediator, mediators who violate the Standards of Professional
Conduct, FLA. R. MEDIATORS 10.200-10.690 (West 2003), are subject to sanction
under the Rules of Discipline established by the Florida Supreme Court, FLA. R.
MEDIATORS 10.700-10.900 (West 2003). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-4
(Michie 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (2002) (providing, however, that
mediators can be disciplined in accordance with rules developed by the state's
Supreme Court); W. VA. R. PRAC. & FAM. CT. 45 (Michie 2003). But see Amanda
K. Esquibel, The Case of the Conflicted Mediator: An Argument for Liability and
Against Immunity, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 131, 140 (1999) (arguing that "given the
position of trust that the mediator occupies, the mediator is also in a position to
harm the participants through contractual or tortious breaches"); Jennifer L. Schulz,
Mediator Liability in Canada: An Examination of Emerging American and
Canadian Jurisprudence, 32 OTTAWA L. REV. 269, 273 (2001) (arguing that
mediator immunity is unnecessary in Canada because there are "no pressing
reasons" for such immunity).
93 See Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope ofMediatorlmmunity: When Mediators
Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 629, 661-62
(1997).
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immunity protects defendants in the good-faith exercise of their duties but
does not extend to acts made in bad faith or with malice.94 In Arizona, for
example, mediators do not have the cloak of absolute judicial immunity;
instead, they are immune "except for those acts or omissions that involve
intentional misconduct or reckless disregard of a substantial risk of a
significant injury to the rights of others."95 Similarly, in Colorado, the
liability of mediators is "limited to willful or wanton misconduct." 96
These protections exist even though some commentators have criticized
the extension of judicial immunity to providers of alternative dispute
resolution 97 and have noted that the term "mediation" describes many types
of interventions. For example, mediations may follow the labor manage-
ment model, the legal model, the therapeutic model, or the communication
and information model.9" Whatever the approached used, commentators
disagree as to whether mediation actually "transform[s] hostile couples into
cooperative ones," 99 and some have complained that "research cannot indi-
cate whether mediation ... is more effective than a nonspecific placebo
treatment."' 00 Still, many jurisdictions are eager to find ways to offer, and
in some cases mandate, alternatives to traditional litigation'0 ' in an effort
94 See id. at 640.
9' ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 2003). See also ALASKA STAT. §
47.12.450 (Michie 2002) (protecting mediators at community dispute resolution
centers); DEL. CH. CT. R. 174 (2003) ("Designated mediators shall be immune
from civil liability for or resulting from any act or omission done or made while
engaged in efforts to assist or facilitate a mediation, unless the act or omission was
made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a
willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another."). In South
Carolina, mediators "shall not be liable to any person for any act or omission in
connection with any mediation conducted under [Family Court mediation] rules."
S.C. ALT. DISPUTE RESOL. 8(i) (2001).
9
6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-305(6) (West 2002).
9' See, e.g., Kevin C. Gray, Case Comment, Torts-Wagshal v. Foster:
Mediators, Case Evaluators, and Other Neutrals-Should They Be Absolutely
Immune?, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1996) (arguing that the "best method
of assuring the quality of the neutrals and the ADR Services they provide is to
make the neutrals civilly liable for their actions and allow them the common law
defenses that already exist").
98 BECK & SALES, supra note 85, at 9.
9 Id. at 165.
'Id. at 164.
oI See Kaplan, supra note 87, 7 ("It is frequently noted that judges are
unhappy and uncomfortable making custody determinations.").
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to restore the equilibrium in the family °2 and to avoid turning children into
victims of litigation.' 3 While the traditional system of winner and loser in
litigation is in many cases inadequate in dealing with the emotional world
of divorcing parents, mediation may be the first step in stabilizing families
coping with divorce.
C. Immunity for Child Investigators
Mr. Smith contacts the state's child protection agency and reports that
John has come from his mother's house with a large bruise on his back. He
suspects that Mrs. Smith 's new boyfriend beat John. Mr. Smith gives to the
responding investigator a list of fifteen people whom he wants her to
interview about the case. When the investigator closes the case without
interviewing those on the list, stating that there is no evidence of abuse,
Mr. Smith files a complaint for negligence. The complaint alleges that the
investigator failed to investigate adequately the allegation of physical
abuse.
Legislatures almost uniformly recognize the importance of immunity
for those who investigate and report on claims of abuse and neglect. In
some instances, the statute is couched in sweeping terms.' 4 Even where
protection appears to be somewhat more qualified, statutes typically grant
immunity for statements made in good faith. 5
102 Id. 3 (noting that "mediation for child custody will make a significant
contribution to the restoration of equilibrium in the family and serve the best
interest of children").
03 Id. 6 (stating that "when children are involved in the adversarial process
of divorce they typically become victims").
104 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-6-1 (West 2003); 2003 MD. LAWS ch.
308, § 5-708; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.625(5) (West 2002) (exempting from
immunity negligent acts that cause injury or death); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.556(4) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-125 (2003) (extending
immunity to the officers, employees, and representatives of the state agency that
investigates child abuse and licenses foster homes); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-
203(1) (2002) (exempting from immunity acts that are grossly negligent or in bad
faith); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-716 (2002) (exempting from immunity "maliciously
false statements"); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 419 (McKinney 2003) (exempting from
immunity acts of willful misconduct or gross negligence).
"' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-9 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-517
(Michie 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-3 (LEXIS 2002); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/9 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1507(k) (2002) (giving immunity
where information is provided "without malice"); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 611
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4014 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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Where courts are called upon to interpret the scope of immunity, they
commonly find immunity "necessary to protect social workers in their vital
work from the harassment of civil suits."'" Recognizing that a social
worker's independence "would be compromised were [she] constantly in
fear that a mistake could result in a time-consuming and financially
devastating civil suit,"' 7 courts have resisted parents' attempts to make
social workers a "lightning rod for harassing litigation.""1 8 In other cases,
courts have focused not on the needs of court-appointed workers, but
instead on the welfare of the children involved:
The welfare of the state's children would bejeopardized if social workers
had to weigh their decision in terms of their potential personal liability. In
short, the denial of absolute immunity here has the potential to adversely
affect the efficient functioning of the state's child welfare system.
Additionally, the chances are high that suits against the social workers
would occur with some degree of regularity. Parents, resentful of and
humiliated by an attempt to usurp their rights, would likely channel their
frustration "into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the
State's advocate."'109
9:6-8.29 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-09 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.3523 (West 2003); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6318 (West 2003);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-545 (Law. Co-op. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-
410(1) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1512 (Michie 2003); W.VA. CODE § 49-6A-
6 (2003); Wis. STAT. § 48.981(4) (2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-209 (Michie
2002).
"0 Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal. App. 3d 869, 881 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (granting social workers who performed investigative tasks related to
child abuse allegations absolute immunity from suit).
100 Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Sen's., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding "that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in
performing quasi-prosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit
of child dependency proceedings").
108 Coverdell v. Dep't of Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a social worker who carries out judicial order in child apprehension
case is granted absolute quasi-judicial immunity).
"0 Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Sen's., 884 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976)) (holding that social workers are
absolutely immune from liability arising from their role in filing a removal
petition); see also Jenkins v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. App. 3d 278, 287 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (asserting that refusal to hold social worker absolutely immune
from suits arising out of worker's effort to protect child "would indirectly eliminate
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D. CASAs and GALs: A Welter of Protections
If the judge presiding over the Smith case is concerned about the
couple's children, she may appoint a CASA to make recommendations
regarding the children 's best interest.
Communities across the United States have developed a variety of
programs to provide advocacy for children in court proceedings. Many of
these programs use CASAs, who are known in some jurisdictions as
guardians ad litem ("GALs"); under either name, most are members of the
National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association, which trains
community volunteers to act as officers of the court."0 These volunteers
also make recommendations as to a child's best interest in litigation."'
Courts can appoint lawyers to act as GALs,"2 although the role of the so-
called law guardian has been described as hybrid of "attorney/advocate and
investigator/proponent.""' 3 Both CASAs and law guardians have been
granted immunity by legislatures and courts because they promote the
child's best interest."
4
CASAs are widely considered to be necessary to protect children." 5
Although the concept of a child advocate has its roots in abuse-neglect
the protection afforded to children"); Martin v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 544 N.W.2d
651,656 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (" 'The threat of a suit like this one could make any
social worker back off from making discretionary decisions that he or she would
otherwise believe to be in the child's best interest."' (quoting CAS defendant's
brief)).
"0 See Michael S. Piraino, Law Representation of Abused and Neglected
Children, 1 J. CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 63, 68 (1999).
"I Id. at 66.
112 Id. (noting that federal legislation allows a GAL to be "a lawyer, a court
appointed special advocate, or both").
"I Bradt v. White, 740 N.Y.S.2d 777, 781-82 (2002); see also id. at 781
(noting that the law guardian's responsibility is to "determine the child's best
interests and the child's wishes are but one factor to be considered").
" 4 Id. at 782.
"' See, e.g., In re Report of the Family Court Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d 518,
526-27 (Fla. 2001) (listing GALs as one of twelve elements "essential ... to a
model family court ... in all family cases involving abuse, neglect, abandonment
and children at risk of harm"). But see Richard Ducote, Guardians Ad Litem in
Private Custody Litigation: The Case for Abolition, 3 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 106,
115-16 (2002) (arguing, inter alia, that GALs have ill-defined roles, usurp the role
of the judge, deprive parents of privacy, and are unaccountable for their actions).
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dependency litigation, many commentators call for some type of child
advocacy in a "custody, visitation, and parentage litigation."' 16 The CASA
and GAL".7 networks (these individuals will be hereinafter referred to
collectively as CASAs) currently have about 843 programs serving 900
jurisdictions across the U.S.," 8 with over 70,000 volunteers." 9 The res-
ponsibilities of these community-trained volunteers may include the fol-
lowing:
" reviewing records[;]
" interviewing appropriate parties involved in the case, including the
child[;]
* determining if a permanent plan has been created for the child and
whether appropriate services, including reasonable efforts, are being
provided to the child and fanily[;]
* submitting a signed written report with recommendations to the court
on what placement and services are best for the child[;]
* attending court hearings[; and]
* maintaining complete records about the case, including appointments,
interviews, and information gathered about the child and the child's
life circumstances.
120
116 Sheila M. Murphy, Essay, Guardians Ad Litem: The Guardian Angels of
Our Children in Domestic Violence Court, 30 LoY. U. CHILD. L.J. 281,287 (1999)
("The need for guardians ad litem is particularly necessary in custody, visitation,
and parentage litigation. The presence of guardians ad litem would help prevent
batterers from using children as tools or pawns in domestic violence court.
Moreover, when the parents' attorneys fail to do so, a guardian ad litem could bring
the issue of domestic violence, as well as any potential drug abuse by either parent,
to the attention ofjudges making custody or visitation decisions."). But see Raven
C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child Custody
Cases: The Contours ofour Judicial System Stretched BeyondRecognition, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 255, 261 (1998) (arguing that there is no need for GALs in
disputed custody cases, and that they "often undermine[ ] the normal functioning
of the courts").
li The term guardian ad litem, referring to the judicial protection of children,
dates to English common law. Today the term describes both attorneys and non-
lawyer volunteers. See Piraino, supra note 110, at 63. Piraino's discussion of the
history of the term "guardian ad litem" and description of various models used by
courts to protect children's best interests provide a helpful overview of the
development and growth of the CASA system.
"' Id. at 64.
"9 Nat'l CASA Ass'n, About CASA, at http://www.nationalcasa.org/htm/
about.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
120 NAT'L CASA ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL CASA ASSOCIATION
MEMBER PROGRAMS § VIII.E (2002) [hereinafter NAT'L CASA ASS'N,
2003-2004]
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State CASA organizations usually employ staff members to train,
coordinate, and supervise those volunteers.1  CASA programs are funded
mostly by the states, National CASA, and the courts."'
National CASA has developed standards for CASAs." 3 Federal
legislation has also recognized the crucial function of CASAs. The Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act states that the role of a CASA is "(I)
to obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation and needs of the
child; and (I) to make recommendations to the court concerning the best
interests of the child."1
24
Although the CASA network was developed to focus on children in
juvenile dependency proceedings, commentators have increasingly seen the
need for CASAs to protect children caught in their parents' civil custody
litigation."' The frequent coincidence of domestic violence and child
maltreatment,"26 as well as the pervasive allegations of child abuse and
illicit parental behavior raised in disputed custody litigation,"27 have led
courts to appoint CASAs in these high-conflict custody cases."2 As one
STANDARDS], http://www.casanet.org/download/guides-manuals/standards-and-
self-assessment-for-casa-programs/ncasaa-standards-for-member-programs-l0-
02.pdf.
"' "State CASA organizations reported a median of two full-time paid staff
persons .... Just over one-third (35%) had only one full-time staff person, and
9% had none. Nearly one-fifth (18%) had more than ten full-time staff." NAT'L
CASAASS'N, ANNUAL STATE ORGANIZATION SURVEY 2001,11 (200 1) [hereinafter
STATE SURVEY], http://www.casanet.org/download/casa-surveys/2001-ncasa-
survey-statereport.pdf.
"2 Id. at9.
2 See NAT'L CASA ASS'N, STANDARDS, supra note 120.
"14 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2003).
" Cf. Dana E. Prescott, The Guardian Ad Litem in Custody and Conflict
Cases: Investigator, Champion, and Referee?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
529, 530 (2000) (discussing the crucial role GALs play in custody battles).
126 See, e.g., Christine A. O'Riley & Cindy S. Lederman, Co-occurring Child
Maltreatment and Domestic Violence: The Judicial Imperative to Ensure
Reasonable Efforts, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2001, at 41-42 ("Too often, without
intervention, family violence results in child homicide. Each year we continue to
observe that a history of domestic violence is prevalent in more than one third of
the child abuse death cases.").
127 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 116, at 289 ("In addition to alerting judges
to the issue of domestic violence as a whole, guardians ad litem could also bring
forth evidence of any potential substance abuse by parents in a custody or visitation
proceeding.").
"18 Id. at 299 ("[G]uardians ad litem must be appointed to represent children
in domestic violence court where decisions regarding visitation and custody are
made.").
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court put it: "[T]he need for an independent guardian ad litem is particu-
larly compelling in custody disputes. Often, parents are pitted against one
another in an intensely personal and militant clash. Innocent children may
be pawns in the conflict."' 29
CASAs' expanded participation in proceedings involving children has
resulted in ajagged assortment of immunity laws for these child representa-
tives. Fewer than half the states have passed legislation that specifically
provides civil and/or criminal immunity for CASAs 31 who assist courts by
investigating claims of child abuse or neglect and reporting, as "citizen
advocates,"' 3' to the court. Most of these states provide immunity from both
civil and criminal liability to CASA staff and volunteers13 ' as long as they
are exercising good faith 33 and do not engage in intentional or wanton
misconduct.' 34 Other states bestow immunity by declaring that the CASA
is an officer of the court for purposes of immunity from civil liability.'35
129 Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990).
130 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-522(H) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
19-1-212 (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9006A(2) (2003); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.822(1) (West 2003); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17.1 (West
2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-6-9 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1505a(b)
(2002); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 424.10 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,
§ 1506 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-1010 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-3716 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.4 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §
7003-3.7(D) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A. 170(4), (5) (2001) (amended by 2003
Or. Laws 396); 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6342(b) (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-1-27.2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-127 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-4-132 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-154 (Michie 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.34.105(2) (2003); Wis. STAT. § 48.236(5) (2003).
'3' Nat'l CASA Ass'n, About CASA, supra note 119.
132 See, e.g., Amiz. REV. STAT. § 8-522(H) (2003) (providing immunity from
both civil and criminal liability for the advocate's acts or omissions in connection
with authorized responsibilities performed in good faith); see also 705 ILL. COMp.
STAT. 405/2-17.1 (2003) (extending immunity from civil and criminal liability to
CASAs acting within the scope of appointment); but see WASH. REV. CODE §
13.34.105(2) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1506 (West 2003) (extending
to CASAs immunity from only civil liability).
,33 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 8-522(H) (2003). Several states create a
statutory presumption that the CASA was acting in good faith. See, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 7003-3.7(D) (2002) (presumption that CASAs and GALs are acting
in good faith when participating in a judicial proceeding).
134 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6342 (West 2003) (providing civil
immunity to CASAs except in cases of gross negligence, intentional misconduct,
or reckless, willful or wanton misconduct).
131 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13. 34. 105 (West 2003).
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Without explicit legislative guidance, some courts have relied on
common law principles to extend absolute judicial immunity to CASAs.1
36
Some judges have recognized the potential for parents' harassment and
intimidation of child representatives in disputed custody cases and have
therefore extended absolute immunity to CASAs.'" As a Nevada court
observed:
CASA and its volunteers perform a valuable and integral function by
assisting courts in evaluating cases involving children. Exposure to
liability could deter their acceptance of court appointments or color their
recommendations. Indeed, such exposure could produce a chilling effect
upon future acceptances of court appointments and the willingness of
private citizens to volunteer their time to serve as special advocates'
38
Similarly, a New York court weighing the decision to restrict an aggrieved
parent's right to sue an attorney law guardian decided that" 'from a public
policy perspective, it is better to have a diligent, unbiased and objective
advocate to assist the court in determining and protecting the best interest
of the child than it is to assure that the minor child may later recover
damages in tort.' ,139 In Connecticut, another court shielded an attorney law
guardian from tort liability, noting:
136 See, e.g., Janicki v. Subbloie, No. CV0102778485, 2002 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1026, at *7-10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2002). The court in that case
noted that Connecticut law does not clearly indicate whether GALs are covered by
any type of immunity. Id. at *6 n.2. Still, the court stated that "[p]ublic policy
requires that [GALs] be allowed the protection of absolute immunity because to
expose them to the possibility ofpersonal liability will deter them from working as
advocates for minor children." Id. at *9-10.
137 See, e.g., Bluntt v. O'Connor, 737 N.Y.S.2d 471, 480 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002). Quoting the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the court remarked that "opening
the door to negligence liability.., would likely result in a decline in the number
of attorneys willing to serve as GALs in custody proceedings." Id. at 479 (citing
Paige K.B. v. Molepske, 580 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Wis. 1998)); see also Kurzawa v.
Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a GAL was entitled to
absolute immunity under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Briscoe v. Lattue,
460 U.S. 800 (1983)).
"' Foster v. Washoe Co., 964 P.2d 788, 793 (Nev. 1998) (internal citations
omitted) (holding that CASAs and CASA volunteers are entitled to absolute quasi-
judicial immunity).
39 Bradt v. White, 740 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784 (2002) (quoting Paige K.B. v.
Molepske, 580 N.W.2d 289, 294 (Wis. 1998)) (holding that attorney "law
guardians" of children who are subjects of family court proceedings are entitled to
immunity). The court noted that a "law guardian... is not strictly an arm of the
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In cases involving the custody of children, parents often demonstrate a
lack of professional and emotional judgment. It is specifically for this
reason that the court made the decision to appoint the defendant as the
attorney for the minor child. Therefore, her actions in that role should be
protected from tort liability.14
0
Thus, some state courts have recognized absolute "derived judicial
immunity"'141 or "absolute quasi-judicial immunity"' 42 for CASAs and law
guardians. 43 In addition, federal courts have specifically concluded that
GALs, functioning as agents of the court, are entitled to "absolute quasi-
judicial immunity for these activities integrally related to the judicial
process."' 44 Over half the states, however, do not have separate legislative
immunity provisions for CASA workers; 45 in those states courts must
determine whether CASAs are immune from suit.
146
Court, but ... has the hybrid role of attorney/advocate and investigator/proponent
of the child's best interests .... [T]he roles are so intertwined as to warrant
treatment of the law guardian for immunity purposes in the same manner as a
guardian ad litem whose role is to promote the best interests of the child." Id. at
781-82.
14 Carrubba v. Moskowitz, No. CV0008023545, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
596, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2002), aft'd, 2004 Conn. App. LEXIS 40
(Conn. App. Ct. Feb. 3, 2004). The court held to this reasoning several months later
in Janicki, No. CVO 102778485, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1026, at *9 (holding
that a GAL was entitled to absolute judicial immunity because she was court-
appointed, and therefore an "arm of the court").
141Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that
a GAL acting within the scope of her employment is entitled to absolute immunity
because she acts "as an integral part of the judicial system or an 'arm of the
court"' (citing Briscoe v. Lattue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983))). Id. at 782, 786.
42 Berndt v. Molepske, 565 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (declaring
absolute quasi-judicial immunity for GALs), aff'd sub nom. Peterson v. Molepske,
580 N.W.2d 289 (1998). The court held that GALs' "functions are intimately
related" to those of the Court. Id.
141 See, e.g., Bradt, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 781; see also supra note 139.
' Cokv. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989).
145 See supra notes 130-35.
"6 See, e.g., George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Role Duality and the Issue of Immunity
for the Guardian Ad Litem in the District of Columbia, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279,
299 (2002) (stating that if the District of Columbia enacted immunity legislation
for GALs, "statutory immunity would mean that a guardian would be able to
function solely in the best interests of the child without fear of professional
malpractice suits" and that "the uncertainty that comes with a trial court having to
employ a functions analysis.., would be done away with").
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E. Mental Health Professionals: Emerging Calls for Immunity
Both Mr. and Mrs. Smith retain their own separate psychologists to
testify as to their individual fitness as parents. Both sides' attorneys file
multiple motions to exclude the other's psychological reports. Frustrated
with the specter of dueling professionals, the judge appoints an independ-
ent custody evaluator to make a recommendation as to custody and
parental responsibility. Mr. Smith sues the custody evaluator, alleging that
the resulting evaluation was improperly biased in favor of Mrs. Smith.
Mental health clinicians have struggled to develop processes to deal
with high-conflict parents, who possess anomalous behavioral traits that are
a therapist's nightmare. 47 It is a relatively new phenomenon for courts to
involve mental health professionals in custody cases. 4 8 When courts ask
clinicians to conduct parenting or child custody evaluations to assist the
court with tasks such as determining the child's best interests in custody
and visitation, those mental health professionals find themselves cast
directly into the war zone. Several authors have sounded the call for
standardizing parenting evaluators' professional practices so that these
experts can provide courts with needed information without fearing
retaliatory litigation from disgruntled parents.'4 9 Unfortunately, the
animosity of irate parents who have engaged in "hostile attacks" on
parenting evaluators and therapists apparently discourages many of these
professionals from working with these families. 5 ° One survey of the
member boards of the Association of State and Provincial Psychology
Boards found that psychologists who conduct child custody evaluations
47 See Barry Bricklin & Gail Elliot, Qualifications of and Techniques to Be
Used by Judges, Attorneys, and Mental Health Professionals Who Deal with
Children in High Conflict Divorce Cases, 22 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L. REv. 501,
507 (2000) (noting that litigants in high-conflict divorce cases manifest narcissism,
anger, self-righteousness, and "blaming orientations").
'48 The practice of using custody evaluations became widespread only about
fifteen years ago. See BARiS ET AL., supra note 16, at ix.
' See, e.g., Schacht, supra note 3, at 588-90 (outlining a proposal to extend
immunity to experts involved in custody evaluations, except in cases of egregious
conduct on the part of the expert); see also Karl Kirkland, The Epistemology of
Child Custody Evaluations, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 185, 188 (2002) (stating that "[a]s
the field has grown, the components of the [child custody evaluation] have come
under tremendous increases in scrutiny and a directly related need for standard-
ization of professional practices").
150 Stem et al., supra note 22, at 349.
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will probably be subjected to a related licensure board complaint. 5 '
Parenting evaluators are warned of the intensity of custody litigation;'52
they are advised that they may see extreme action, based on parents'
despair and rage "as witnessed in increased family violence and violent
courthouse incidents."'53 The American Psychological Association states:
The practice of psychotherapy is being adversely affected by the proli-
feration of personal threats, complaints, and lawsuits against therapists by
clients and their families. Many therapists are carefully screening their
words and actions to minimize the risks. Other refuse to work with clients
who are or have been in violent family relationships.15
Several authors have called for legislatures to extend judicial immunity
to mental health professionals who act in good faith while serving as court-
ordered parenting evaluators in disputed custody cases.'55 We found no
state laws expressly bestowing immunity on court-appointed evaluators;
still, many state and federal courts, using the function approach, 56 have
extended common law judicial immunity to psychologists and psychiatrists
upon finding that they act "as arms of the court and [perform] functions
I' Karl Kirkland & Kristin L. Kirkland, Frequency of Child Custody Eval-
uation Complaints and Related Disciplinary Action: A Survey of the Association
ofState and ProvincialPsychology Boards, 32 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 17 1,
171-74 (2001). The survey, completed by thirty-four of the organization's sixty-
one members boards, revealed 2413 complaints against practitioners from 1990 to
August 1999. Boards disciplined practitioners in only one percent of those cases.
152 Philip Stahl, Ethical Considerations, in ASS'N OF FAMILY AND
CONCILIATION COURTS, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR CUSTODY EVALUATORS: A
HANDBOOK FOR PARENTING EVALUATIONS ch. 3 (Phil Bushard & Dorothy A.
Howard eds., 1995).
153 Id.
Im AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 17, at 27.
'55 Schacht, supra note 3, recommends that each state "establish a Custody and
Child Abuse Evaluation Board or Commission to set standards for the credentials
and conduct of experts involved in custody evaluations." Id. at 589. His ideas,
however, are not far-ranging enough. Many of the service providers that the courts
rely on would not be considered "experts" and therefore would not fit into
Schacht's immunity vision. See id. (characterizing as experts only those who are
"selected and appointed by the judge to advise the court"). Our scope is much
broader.
156 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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integral to the judicial process." '57 On the other hand, such professionals
must be very careful: quasi-judicial immunity has been held not to apply if
the evaluator's contract with the parties does not contain language
characterizing the evaluator as an arm of the court, even where the court
order contains language mandating such an evaluation. 58
Other mental health professionals besides psychologists and psychia-
trists can conduct custodial evaluations for courts. Without statutory
guidance, immunity in this area is developing through case law; this may
leave evaluator defendants twisting in the legal winds for years before
courts extricate them by granting immunity. In Stone v. Glass,"5 9 a
Kentucky court noted that it could find no state case law regarding the
immunity of social workers who perform court-ordered custody evalua-
tions. 60 The parent in Stone v. Glass initiated litigation against the social
worker in 1993;161 the appeals court rendered its opinion granting her quasi-
judicial immunity in 2000.162
157 Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
evaluators' main duties were "to engage in neutral fact-finding and advise the
court"); see also Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1092-93 (Alaska 1994)
(granting custody investigator absolute immunity); Lavit v. Superior Court, 839
P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (granting absolute immunity to
psychologist who performed child custody evaluation "as an expert for the court");
Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (entitling
psychologist custody evaluator to same immunity given others who function as
neutrals in resolving disputes); S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So. 2d 244, 247 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (granting psychologist custody evaluators appointed by the court absolute
quasi-judicial immunity); LaLonde v. Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541-42 (Mass.
1989) (granting non-court-appointed psychiatrist evaluator in visitation dispute
immunity "because of the function he performed [and its] essential connection to
the judicial process"); Duff v. Lewis, 958 P.2d 82, 86 (Nev. 1998) (finding
psychiatrist performed "integral function in assisting courts" entitling him to
absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 782
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (granting psychologist custody evaluator absolute quasi-
judicial immunity upon finding his function "intimately associated with the judicial
process"); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496,499 (Utah 1998) (finding psychologist
custody evaluator immune from suit).
158 See Politi v. Tyler, 751 A.2d 788, 792 (Vt. 2000) (concluding that the
evaluator was not "performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function pursuant to a
court directive").
"9 Stone v. Glass, 35 S.W.3d 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).
'60 Id. at 829.
161 Id. at 828.
162 Id. at 830 (holding that "court-appointed custodial evaluators should be
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity").
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As modem courts struggle to deal with high-conflict families, they
solicit the help of many professionals with many labels: parenting
coordinators, re-contact clinicians, emergency case stabilization clinicians,
and supervised visitation clinicians, to name a few. 6 3 One author has
described these professionals as being "interventionists for the family,"
rather than "expert[s] for the court.""' We view this as an empty distinc-
tion; at a time when judges "articulate frustration over the fact that they are
trained to answer questions of law, not to 'manage social work cases,' ,
65
it has become a truly judicial function to "manage" these dysfunctional
families by soliciting and appointing neutral assistance.
In the case of a mental health professional appointed as an emergency
case stabilizer, for example, the courts want a quick assessment of serious
issues "prior to writing temporary orders in a case."' Its preliminary
nature distinguishes this service from a formal custody evaluation, but, we
argue, both interventions create the same risk of retaliatory lawsuits.
Emergency case stabilization and other "forensically informed therapeutic
interventions,"1 67 designed to assist the court in determining the children's
best interests and reducing conflict, deserve legislatures' attention within
certain limits. 68 Absent legislative action, the continued need to address the
problems of high-conflict families-and there is no sign that these cases
will go away--guarantees a glut of future cases of first impression to
determine whether judicial immunity should be extended.
F. The Volunteer Protection Act: A Federal Approach to Limiting
Liability
Recognizing that government lacks the capacity to carry out all needed
services and that volunteers make important contributions in their
communities, Congress passed the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997
163 Lynn M. Kenney & Diana Vigel, A Lawyer's Guide to Therapeutic Inter-
vention in Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 629, 635-39 (1996)
(discussing the roles of mental health professionals in family law settings).
'64 Id. at 635.
165 Id. at 633 (citing an anonymous judge's comment).
'6 Id. at 649-50 (emphasis added).
167 Id. at 653.
'6 Of course, fairness requires that the goals and boundaries of the inter-
vention-as well as confidentiality requirements, if any--be addressed by the
court.
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("VPA").'69 Declaring that "the willingness of volunteers to offer their
services is deterred by the potential for liability actions against them,"'
170
the VPA limits the liability of volunteers of nonprofit organizations and
government agencies.17 1 Relevant provisions of the Act provide that no
volunteer of a nonprofit organization or governmental entity shall be liable
for harm caused by her act or omission as long as the volunteer was acting
within the scope of her responsibilities; was properly certified, licensed, or
authorized by authorities, if required or appropriate; and was not acting in
a grossly negligent, reckless, willful, or criminal manner.
172
Several states offered qualified immunity for nonprofit corporation
volunteers before the federal legislation was passed. 73 Other states subse-
169 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2003). The concept of granting immunity for
charitable work has deep roots in American law. The doctrine of charitable
immunity, which insulates charities but holds volunteers liable, began in 1876,
when the court in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432,
434 (Mass. 1876), overruled in part by Colby v. Comey Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407
(Mass. 1969), overruled in part as stated by O'Connell v. State, 795 A.2d 857
(N.J. 2002), held that a hospital's charitable status protected it from tort liability.
Unlike the charitable immunity doctrine, the federal Volunteer Protection Act
provides qualified immunity to the volunteer but does not affect the agency's
liability. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(c). For an interesting examination of how courts began
the shift from protecting the organization to protecting the individual, see President
& Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810,814 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(questioning why doctors who volunteered at a hospital could be held liable while
the hospital in which they worked retained immunity for tortious acts).
170 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1).
'7' Id. § 14501(a)(7).
17 1 Id. § 14503(a). Certain additional exceptions apply: The Act does not apply
to misconduct that constitutes a crime of violence, an act of terrorism, a hate crime,
a sexual offense, or a violation of civil rights, or to misconduct caused by the use
of alcohol or drugs. Id. § 14503(f). In addition, the defendant is not protected from
harm caused by operating a vehicle. Id. § 14503(a)(4). The Act states that "liability
reform for volunteers, will promote the free flow of goods and services, lessen
burdens on interstate commerce and uphold constitutionally protected due process
rights," as well as addressing "legitimate fears of volunteers about frivolous,
arbitrary, or capricious lawsuits." Id. § 1450 1(a)(7)(A), (D).
173 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-336 (2003) (enacted in 1991); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-102 (Michie 2003) (enacted in 1987) (recognizing the "spirit of
volunteerism"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8135 (2003) (enacted in 1992) (granting
liability for medical and dental clinic volunteers); GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 51-1-20
(2003) (enacted in 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3601 (2002) (enacted in 1987); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2792.9 (West 2002) (enacted in 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (2003) (enacted in 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10 (2003)
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quently enacted their own volunteer protection acts, consistent with the
requirements of the federal legislation.'74 As with the federal act, state
legislation appears to have grown out of concern over the specter of high
liability costs and unwarranted litigation costs in cases against volun-
teers.
75
Ill. THE INADEQUATE SCOPE OF CURRENT PROTECTION:
DEVELOPING NEEDED IMMUNITIES
The hodgepodge of state-created protections described in the preceding
section hardly amounts to a coherent system of immunities for those
assigned to promote the welfare of vulnerable children. Nor do other safe-
guards, such as the Volunteer Protection Act and its state counterparts 76 or
liability insurance, 177 adequately shield these stewards from dissatisfied
parents' legal harassment and intimidation. Accordingly, we propose a
framework through which legislatures can develop and courts can apply
immunities for those actors whose presence in custody cases promises to
reduce conflict.
(enacted in 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.1 (West 2003) (enacted in 1987);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-6-g(a) (2002) (enacted in 1984).
174 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.5 (2003) (enacted in 1997);HAW. REV.
STAT. § 662D-2 (2002) (enacted in 1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/2-214 (2003)
(enacted in 1998) (granting liability for court volunteers); IND. CODE § 34-30-4-2
(2003) (enacted in 1999) (liability for directors of nonprofit agencies). 42 U.S.C.
§ 14502(a) allows states to grant volunteers protection from liability beyond that
provided in the VPA, but preempts more restrictive state laws. A state may,
however, pass legislation exempting from the VPA all state court civil actions "in
which all parties are citizens of the State." Id. § 14502(6). Several states pursued
this option. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292 (2003) (enacted in 1998)
(choosing expressly "not to have the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 apply to any
civil action against a volunteer in a New Hampshire court, in which all parties are
citizens of New Hampshire"). New Hampshire does, however, limit the liability of
volunteers who assist the Police Standards and Training Council in its programs.
See N.H. REv. STAT. § 188-F:32 (2003).
175 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-6-102 (Michie 2003) ("While there are no
known recent instances in Arkansas where a volunteer has been subjected to
personal liability for negligence in performing volunteer duties ... the perceived
insurance crisis has heightened concern among many who would provide volunteer
services .... ).
'
76 See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
177 See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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A. Existing Immunity Provisions: A Tattered Cloak
The most glaring defect of present immunities under state law is their
scattered availability. Beyond judicial immunity, no single approach toward
protecting CASAs and other family court actors commands universal
support among states. Even more lacking is a broader vision of the degree
of tort immunity to which these actors should be entitled. This motley array
of protections stands in tension with the move toward a unified family court
model, an approach recognizing that family conflicts are complex and
deeply intertwined.
Nor does the Volunteer Protection Act supply a sufficient safety net for
providers of family court services excluded from state immunity. Although
some court services necessary to reduce conflict may be supplied by
volunteers (and are thus presumably protected by the Act), several services
would not fit under the Act's umbrella of protection. In the area of
supervised visitation, 7 ' for example, communities have responded
creatively and variously to the need for visitation program staff. The VPA
defines a volunteer as "an individual performing services for a nonprofit
organization or a governmental entity who does not receive (A) compensa-
tion (other than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses
actually incurred); or (B) any other thing of value in lieu of compensation,
in excess of $500 per year, and such term includes a volunteer serving as
a director, officer, trustee, or direct service volunteer."' 7 9 Supervised
visitation programs in the United States have provided various types of
compensation to those who monitor visits: awarding college credit to
student monitors; 8° paying hourly wages to staff who moonlight as
monitors but work full-time in other professions;' 8' paying retirees and
local teachers to monitor visits on weekends. 2 Thus, even those who
receive a relatively small amount of compensation are stripped of their
protections under the Act.'83
178 Supervised visitation programs are discussed in more detail at infra Part
IV.A.
9 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6).
i80 See, e.g., Policies and Procedures of The Family Visitation Program of
Tallahassee (on file with authors).
... Interview with Betsy Baird, Program Director, Transition Family Visitation
Center, Inc. in Liberty, Mo. (Mar. 7, 2003) (on file with authors).
'2 For example, this policy has been implemented at The Family Connection,
West Palm Beach, Florida, Barbara Pope, Director.
113 Moreover, while we have not discovered any legal efforts to question the
validity of the Volunteer Protection Act, even its core immunity provisions may be
susceptible to constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court in recent years has
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The availability of insurance likewise offers only an illusory buffer
from the threat of litigation. Several states, including Kansas, California,
and Florida, require supervised visitation programs to carry liability
insurance. 184 While the existence of such insurance may serve to placate
worried program staff, it does not negate the need for legislatively crafted
immunity. In fact, the existence of insurance policies may actually invite
lawsuits:
Who gets sued often depends on who has insurance. The complaint
is often amended, and the discovery and trial strategy accordingly altered,
to conform to what the insurance policy covers and what it does not. The
value of the case, which we so often assume to be a function of the
substantive tort law and costs of civil process, may be just as much a
function of how much insurance coverage the defendant has purchased
.... It is certainly possible that some forms of tort litigation might never
have developed had not some insurance broker first paved the way by
exhibited a willingness to overturn federal legislation thought to intrude upon the
prerogatives of the states. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619
(2000) (invalidating civil damages under Violence Against Women Act as
exceeding scope of congressional power under Commerce Clause); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act
on Commerce Clause grounds), superceded by statute as stated in United States v.
Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 933-35 (1997) (finding provision of Brady Act requiring local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks of certain gun purchasers to
violate constitutional scheme of dual sovereignty); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 182-83 (1992) (invalidating federal directive to some states either to take
ownership of nuclear waste within state's borders or to regulate waste according
to federal specifications). Our argument does not hinge on any constitutional
infirmity of the VPA; the success of such a challenge, however, would obviously
bolster our position that the Acts provide insufficient protection to service
providers.
184 See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF FLA., STANDARDS FOR SUPERVISED
VISITATION, PROGRAM AGREEMENTS 9 (1999), at http://www.flcourts.org/osca/
divisions/family/bin/svnstandard.pdf [hereinafter FLORIDA VISrrATION STANDARDS]
(stating that a program must have general and liability insurance for staff and
volunteers); OFFICE OF THE KAN. ATTORNEY GEN., CHILD EXCHANGE AND
VISITATION CENTER GUIDELINES § 3, 3.6 (Mar. 1999), at http://www.ink.org/
public/ksag/contents/children/cevc-6.htm (mandating that "[t]here shall be adequate
general liability insurance for directors, staff, volunteers, interns, and clients
utilizing the services") [hereinafter KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES].
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creating awareness of the liability risk and an insurance policy to cover
the judgment. 
85
In addition, settling claims against insured agencies is the norm in the
insurance business. Indeed, "[t]he vast majority of professional liability
claims, like most liability claims, are ultimately settled."'8 6 When an
insurance company settles rather than litigates fully the merits of a case, the
settlement has several negative consequences. First, even if no determina-
tion of wrongdoing is made, the presence of a settled lawsuit leads to the
assumption that the defendant did something wrong. This can damage a
program's ability to obtain volunteers, undermine the court's confidence in
the program, and adversely affect parents' perceptions of the program.
Also, when insurance companies raise the programs' rates, programs
already underfunded may cut back services or close.
Finally, it should be noted that the need for a comprehensive scheme
of immunity does not rest solely on the fact that psychologists, mediators,
CASAs, and other court assistants have been sued in the past. Nor does it
rest on an anticipated explosion of litigation against past providers of
services to children touched by high-conflict divorce. Rather, nonprofit
organizations' concerns about their staff's potential liability may hinder the
organizations' valuable activities. Organizations fear that they may be
unable to absorb the costs incurred by accidental injury; similarly,
nonprofits may feel that it is their duty to expend donors' funds on
providing services, not paying tort costs.'87 It is the pervasive fear of
lawsuits, not their actual incidence, that threatens to derail the momentum
of therapeutic jurisprudence. A relative handful of suits filed by disgruntled
parents could discourage the provision of services to at-risk children by
intimidating providers, diverting resources to legal fees, and inflating
insurance premiums.88 By conferring sufficient immunity to deter unwar-
5 Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (1990).
The author reveals the symbiotic relationship between insurance companies and tort
litigation, arguing compellingly that "liability insurance and tort litigation evolve
together, with each institution acting upon, reacting to, and supporting the other."
Id. at 1115. We are not suggesting that programs decline to carry liability
insurance.
'1 Michael H. Rauch et al., Settlement of Professional Liability Claims, 303
P.L.I./LIT. 177, 179 (1996).
187 Id.
Is The threat of litigation is widely perceived as inhibiting the provision of a
variety of important services, including education and health care. See Stuart
Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 73.
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ranted suits, legislatures can help assure the continued availability and
expansion of these critical services.
B. Developing a Comprehensive System of Immunity
In light of the foregoing, we propose a statutory general presumption
of immunity for those engaged in neutral court-ordered conflict-reduction
services in family court cases. Rather than attempt to define the precise
contours of that immunity for all circumstances, we recommend that
legislatures promulgate criteria and principles to be fleshed out by the
courts. This approach offers the unifying proposition of presumptive
immunity, while at the same time allowing courts to calibrate the degree of
protection to the function performed and the claim asserted."s9
1. Requisites
As indicated above, we believe that the service's mandatoriness and
neutrality constitute the threshold eligibility criteria for granting immunity
to family court service providers. In addition, a legislature should require
minimum standards of practice in order for a function to qualify for
immunity. We explain our understanding of these criteria below.
a. Judicial Mandate
A court directive to provide the service in question is obviously the sine
qua non of any immunity. In part, this requirement reflects the notion that
189 Moreover, different communities may use different terms for certain
services. For example, the term "parenting coordinator" may mean an individual
whose task it is to "educate, mediate, and perhaps arbitrate parental disputes over
the raising of their children," BARIS ET AL., supra note 16, at 10; or it may have a
broader or narrower definition. Our view that labels should not be dispositive in
evaluating immunity from torts claims resembles the Supreme Court's approach to
immunity from civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court focuses on
the nature of the function performed by the defendant and the extent to which
exposure to liability would interfere with the performance of that function. See
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a state court judge was
not cloaked with absolute immunity from sex discrimination suit by probation
officer, because the judge's decision to discharge the plaintiff did not constitute a
"judicial or adjudicative" function), superseded by statute as stated in Leclerc v.
Webb, 270 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. La. 2003).
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the provider's own immunity derives from that of the judge.' 9 To the
extent that the rationale for immunity is that a participant is implementing
ajudicial strategy for coping with the conflict at hand, a nexus to the court
is crucial. 9'
Moreover, confining immunity to judicially required services helps to
keep the standard manageable. A parent locked in a high-conflict custody
dispute might well unilaterally elect to obtain the assistance of individuals
who the parent feels will advance the child's welfare. For example, a parent
might retain her own parenting evaluator, bring the child in for consulta-
tion, and submit herself or the child to psychological testing without the
consent of the other parent or the court. Our described immunity would not
extend to this professional. Without a bright line for immunity drawn at
court-designated participants, arguments could regularly erupt over whether
such individuals-who may simply be "hired guns" for a party-qualify for
statutory protection. 92
Of course, issues could still arise over whether a particular service
provider should be entitled to statutory immunity. Reasonable minds might
differ, for example, over the degree of specificity with which a court must
identify a particular provider and whether parents should have a role in
selecting certain kinds of providers. These types of questions, however, can
be worked out by legislatures and courts while still preserving the benefit
of requiring judicial mandate of the services furnished by the person whose
immunity is at issue.
b. Neutrality
The obligation of neutrality is somewhat more elusive but no less
fundamental. In order to receive statutory protection, individuals charged
with sheltering a child from the fallout of parental conflict must not have
a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.
To extend immunity to hired counsel--or, indeed, to anyone whose
disinterestedness could be seriously questioned-would clash with the
justifications for statutory protection in these cases. Like the judge who
0 See supra note 141 (discussing concept of derived immunity).
91 Judicial orders that approve of or incorporate by reference parents'
agreements to submit to a custody evaluation or other service by a third party,
should be considered to cloak the third party with immunity, since the order
effectively mandates the service.
192 Some organizations "hawk frank terrorist manuals for marital warfare."
Schacht, supra note 3, at 571.
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presides in a high-conflict case, participants who seek immunity from
parents' actions must remain nonpartisan. It is essential, for example, that
those who perform services for the court, and, indeed the court itself,
understand the dynamics of domestic violence. Failure or refusal to
perceive the link between domestic violence and the welfare of children is
not neutrality, but instead a potentially life-threatening error.'93
Admittedly, some cases may raise thorny questions concerning the
nature of neutrality. For example, a participant charged with gathering
information and making recommendations may issue a report that one
parent believes betrays a distressing lack of objectivity. A CASA assigned
to a case involving allegations of abuse may begin her task with no
preconceived suspicions, but ultimately form an opinion that abuse actually
occurred and frame her report accordingly. In our view, such a finding
alone does not establish a lapse in neutrality. A judge often rules decisively
against one parent without abdicating her role as neutral arbiter; similarly,
those charged with helping the judge resolve a custody dispute may arrive
at determinations adverse to one of the parties without violating their duty
of neutrality. Only a clear and specific showing of bias should be permitted
to defeat the presumption of neutrality.
c. Standards of Practice
Barring absolute immunity, which we do not endorse, the question of
whether a service provider is entitled to protection entails a determination
of whether she acted drastically outside the norms of her field. Central to
such a determination are standards against which her conduct can be
assessed. The very concept of gross negligence assumes a benchmark of
behavior deemed reasonable for those similarly situated.'94 Especially in the
"I For a helpful discussion of the problems of neutrality in ignoring domestic
violence, see Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child
Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657, 708-09 (2003). Some courts already
recognize the need for parenting evaluators to understand the dynamics of domestic
violence. See Gregory L. Lecklitner et al., Promoting Safety for Abused Children
and Battered Mothers: Miami-Dade County's Model Dependence Court
Intervention Program, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT 175, 179 (1999) (noting that in
dependency cases, "[a]ll too often court-ordered evaluations have been used against
mothers in court, as potential symptoms of trauma, depression, and other
psychological distress that may be related to domestic violence victimization have
been portrayed as more chronic indices of poor functioning").
'9 See, e.g., Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 831 So. 2d 480, 483 (La. Ct.
App. 2002); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W. 2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1998).
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early phase of construing statutory immunity, courts will be called upon to
determine whether a sufficiently coherent body of practice norms is
available in particular fields. These standards need not take the form of
legal codification; rather, any sort of comprehensive and widely recognized
guidelines will suffice.
For the service providers considered here, the extent to which accepted
standards prevail varies substantially. In evaluating the performance of
mediators, for example, courts can look to standards adopted jointly by the
American Arbitration Association and the ABA Section on Dispute
Resolution. 9 Other codes of conduct help judges determine whether a
defendant family therapist 96 or social worker 97 has adhered to minimum
standards of practice. In the next section, we consider the case of standards
for the staff of supervised visitation programs. 98
2. Mental State
We do not argue for blanket immunity; rather, we would limit the scope
of automatic immunity to protect against only allegations of ordinary
negligence. In most instances, plausible charges of gross negligence,
recklessness, or intentional harm may be considered on their merits. The
exposure of service providers to suits for conduct worse than lack of due
care reflects recognition that the rationales for absolute judicial immunity19
do not fully apply to these individuals. For example, the most effective
remedy for ajudge's wrongful behavior, reversal of an erroneous decision,
will often be unavailable in the case of flagrant conduct by someone with
direct responsibility for a child's well-being. If a CASA recklessly exposes
a child to danger2°° or a heedless social worker drops a baby, the resulting
harm may prove irreparable. Accordingly, considerations of justice and
deterrence point to a qualified immunity.
'95 ABA, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994), http://www.
abanet.prg/dispute/modelstandardsofconduct.doc.
196 See AM. ASS'N OF MARRIAGE & FAM1LY THERAPISTS, AAMFT CODE OF
ETHICs (July 1, 2001), http://www.aamft.org/resources/plan/ethics/ethicscode2O0l.
asp.
191 See NAT'L Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, CODE OF ETMIcs (1999), http://
www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp.
19' See infra notes 291-98 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
20 0 Substantially exceeding the speed limit while transporting the child in city
traffic would be an obvious example.
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On the other hand, the mental state sufficient to trigger immunity need
not be the same in every case. When extending statutory immunity to
service providers and volunteers, 201 legislatures should weigh the desire to
encourage community members' participation in these important services
against any loss of accountability and parents' right of redress for possible
injury. Since that balance will vary according to the circumstances, we do
not propose a single touchstone to govern all claims of immunity. Rather,
we recommend that legislatures promulgate factors that courts must take
into account as they gradually develop more specific mental state require-
ments governing immunity for the various family court service providers.
a. Severity of Harm
In any sliding scale of threshold mental state required to lose immunity,
the harm to a child caused by the service provider's conduct would assume
major significance. If the provider causes major physical injury, then the
lowest level of intent beyond simple negligence would presumably suffice
to remove the cloak of immunity in a suit for damages. Conversely, if the
claim arises out of a trivial harm-especially one done to the parent rather
than child-then the requisite showing should escalate to recklessness or
even outright malice.
b. Objectivity of Duty
One of the principal aims of immunity is to discourage frivolous suits
so as to encourage desirable behavior by the potential targets of such suits.
Because the standard of care for many service providers is subjectively
defined, potential defendants will find it difficult to defeat suits at the
outset in the absence of immunity. For example, while a charge of grossly
negligent counseling might well ultimately be rejected, most defendants
would be unable to have the complaint dismissed on the pleadings.
Accordingly, the intangible nature of the duty owed forms one convincing
argument for a legislative immunity scheme that places a formidable
barrier, such as service provider immunity for all conduct short of
recklessness, in the way of complaining parents. By the same token, where
the duty is defined in concrete terms-e.g., a protocol that social workers
201 Some, but not all, of these volunteers may already be protected by the
Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505. For limitations in the
protection afforded by the Volunteer Protection Act, see supra notes 181-89 and
accompanying text.
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must follow in conducting interviews--then a lesser demonstration of fault
could suffice.20 2
c. Consensus on Standards
A similar consideration in gauging the level of scienter courts must find
to deny service providers immunity is the extent to which defendants
engaged in the activity in question can consult recognized norms. As noted
above,20 3 we believe that minimum standards of practice are necessary for
the provider of a service to qualify for any degree of immunity. The clarity
of those standards, however, will not be identical for each service. For
example, while mediators can look to a nationally recognized code of
conduct, 201 expectations for CASAs are somewhat hazier.205 Accordingly,
the precision or vagueness of standards of performance of a service should
influence the level of intent at which defendants shed immunity. Where
definite codes of behavior exist, barring suits for simple negligence alone
should usually serve the purposes of immunity. Where norms are still
relatively inchoate, then it is generally reasonable to grant defendants a
broader immunity.
d. Nature of Compensation
In determining the mental state level at which immunity no longer
shields service providers, courts should also consider the extent to which
202 It should be noted that norms of practice serve two functions under our
model. First, a minimum level of accepted norms is a prerequisite for any
immunity. Beyond that threshold, the degree of specificity provided may affect the
scope of immunity available; more detailed standards may supply more reliable
guidance, and thus serve as a factor weighing in favor of immunity only against
charges of negligence.
203 See supra Part II.B. 1.
24 See supra note 195.
205 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. For example, the Standards for
State CASA/Guardian Ad Litem Organizations Affiliated with the National CASA
Association list Standard V: "A State organization has policies and procedures that
implement applicable state laws and regulations.. . ." NAT'L CASA Ass'N, supra
note 120, § V. The implementation guidelines accompanying that standard require
only that state organizations have written policies and procedures that cover areas
such as a code of ethics and personnel management. Little specificity is included
as to what should be in the code or the procedures for personnel management,
except for general admonitions against conflict of interests or improper use of rela-
tionships. Id. § VI. The national CASA standards leave the specificity to the state
organizations, which may then develop procedures within very broad parameters.
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the defendant routinely provides the service at issue for compensation
outside the court system. At the core of our proposal of immunity is
concern that the specter of lawsuits and liability will chill citizens'
motivation to offer their time and energy to assist in the healing of
conflicted families. To avoid this disincentive, the defendant's willingness
to provide the service in an essentially voluntary capacity, apart from her
vocation, should militate in favor of a high level of protection.0 6 Con-
versely, a defendant sued for a service for which she is regularly paid and
for which she was paid in this instance should presumptively be entitled to
immunity for ordinary negligence only. The potential for defending a suit
in which the parent must demonstrate gross negligence is unlikely to drive
the service provider out of involvement with the family court system
altogether. 27 After all, the parents with whom she works in family court
matters would bear a greater risk than her other clients would have to bear,
and the fee she earns in private practice may offer a welcome supplement
to the income from her work in the courts. Thus, under our model, an
unpaid college student working as a supervised visitation monitor may
enjoy immunity in a suit for gross negligence when an identically situated
clinical psychologist would not.
In determining the weight to be assigned to volunteer status, a court
should take a functional approach that recognizes the spectrum of
incentives prompting a service provider's involvement in a custody battle.
Between the "pure" volunteer and the seasoned professional lie many
others who receive some form of compensation but cannot reasonably be
charged with working for predominantly pecuniary motives. Some of these
individuals have been previously described, 208 and they should not be
equated with those who provide the service in question as part of their
principal livelihood. In each case, the court should tailor the scope of the
immunity to the rationale of attracting public-spirited citizens who desire
to contribute to the community by assisting its vulnerable children.
206 In some instances, the service provider will be protected by federal law. For
a discussion of the limited scope of the Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
14501-14505, see supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
207 Cf Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748,772 n.24 (1976) (permitting greater regulation ofcommercial speech than
other types in part because "advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits,
[and therefore] there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and
foregone entirely").
208 See supra Part II.D.
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3. Additional Immunity
We emphasize that this proposed legislative scheme is intended to
provide the minimum degree of tort immunity available to service providers
in custody cases. In this nascent area, it is impossible to anticipate every
instance in which immunity may be appropriate. Accordingly, our approach
should supplement rather than supplant judicially crafted immunity in these
cases. Indeed, the legislation itself might provide for some judicial latitude
to recognize immunity in compelling circumstances not captured by express
statutory categories. 09
IV. AN APPLICATION OF TORT IMMUNITY:
SUPERVISED VISITATION PROVIDERS
One area in which our proposal for immunity could avert a danger to
valuable services for at-risk children is supervised visitation and monitored
exchange. Supervised visitation provides reliable parties who have no
personal stake in the outcome to monitor, amidst allegations of parental
misconduct, nonresidential parents' contact with their children.210
Monitored exchanges supply neutral staff to oversee the transfer of the
child back and forth between the parents without monitoring the visit itself.
Supervised visitation and exchange providers constitute both an increas-
ingly important component of the family court system and a ripe target for
disgruntled parents. The value of these providers in addressing high-
conflict custody cases, the providers' vulnerability to multifarious threats
of litigation, and their heavy reliance on lightly compensated volunteers
warrant a liberal measure of immunity for their staff.
A. Supervised Visitation and Monitored Exchange Services
Even though it is commonly expressed public policy to ensure that
minor children of separated or divorced parents have frequent access to
both parents,"' legislatures and courts have acknowledged that conflicts
209 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 807 (making admissible under certain conditions hearsay
statements that do not fall within specific exception but which "hav[e] equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness").210 See, e.g., INST. FOR FAMILY VIOLENCE STUDIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE
TO SUPERVISED VISITATION PROGRAMS 1, http://www.familyvio.ssw.fsu.edu/
lawenforcebook.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
21 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(l)(c) (West 2002)
(asserting that "it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share the rights
and responsibilities of child rearing").
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about visitation are common in disputed divorce and custody cases and
often require additional judicial intervention.212 Faced with conflicting
accusations regarding parental unfitness, courts increasingly rely on
supervised visitation and monitored exchange to protect children while still
allowing contact with their nonresidential parents.213 Frequently, charges
of domestic violence, parental substance abuse, physical and sexual
214abuse, or other parental endangerment of children215 force judges to
212 The state of Utah, for example, created the Expedited Parent-time Enforce-
ment Pilot Program to expedite resolving disputes over "parent-time." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-38 (2003). Many states provide for restrictions on visitation in cases
involving violence and child abuse. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(10)
(2002) (providing that "[a] court may award visitation to a parent who committed
family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision can be made for the
physical safety and psychological well-being of the child"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 34 1(A) (West 1993) ("Whenever a court finds by preponderance of the evidence
that a parent has subjected his or her child to physical abuse, or sexual abuse or
exploitation, or has permitted such abuse or exploitation, . . . the court shall
prohibit visitation... until such parent proves that such visitation would not cause
physical, emotional, or psychological damage to the child.").
2"3 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(6)(B) ("In an order of parental
rights and responsibilities, a court may: (1) Order an exchange of a child to occur
in a protected setting; (2) Order contact to be supervised by another person or
agency. ... "); see also ALA. CODE § 30-3-135 (2003) (allowing restrictions includ-
ing supervised visitation against a parent who has committed violence); MD. CODE
ANN., FAMILY LAW § 9-101 (2003) (instructing the court to deny custody or
visitation to a parent who has abused or neglected his/her child except in cases in
which an approved supervised visitation arrangement can protect the child).
214 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 9-101:
(a) In any custody or visitation proceeding, if the court has reasonable
grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to
the proceeding, the court shall determine whether abuse or neglect is
likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to the party.
(b) Unless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further
child abuse or neglect by the party, the court shall deny custody or
visitation rights to that party, except that the court may approve a
supervised visitation arrangement that assures the safety and the
physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.
21 Other examples of improper, dangerous, and even criminal behavior that
can lead to court-ordered supervised visitation are parental alcoholism, intentional
attempts to estrange the child from the other parent, severe mental illness, and
threats of parental abduction. See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston & Linda K. Girdner,
Family Abductors: Descriptive Profiles and Preventive Interventions, JUV. JUST.
BULL. (Office of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Washington, DC), Jan. 2001, at 2-5, at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojdp/
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decide whether a parent's visitation access should be restricted for the
child's well-being.21 6 In describing the complexities of granting visitation
when, for example, domestic violence plagues a family, a commentator
noted that visits or "parenting time" 27 between the violent parent and the
children "[become] problematic, and can cause judicial headaches, and
participant heartaches. 2  Likewise, one judge described the common
struggle to address parental substance abuse allegations: "The story is
familiar. Every family judge has presided over and every family lawyer has
tried a visitation case involving an alcoholic or other-drug-addicted
parent.
219
In case after case across the United States, courts have turned to
supervised visitation as an alternative to terminating or suspending a
parent's access to the child altogether, trying to "strike[ ] a balance between
the custodial parent's interest in protecting the child, the noncustodial
182788.pdf. The authors list supervised visitation as an intervention for use with
sociopathic parents who demonstrate "blatant disregard of custody orders" and in
cases in which there are threats that a parent may abscond with a child. Id. at 5.
216 In domestic violence cases, the courts are given wide discretion in ordering
parenting arrangements.
While a growing number of states specifically mention domestic violence
as a factor to be considered, most of them allow wide discretion and do
not give it special weight. It is simply one additional factor when
considering the best interests of the child. By the end of the 1997
legislative session, 13 states had adopted the Model Code of the Family
Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges (NCFCJ, 1998). These statutes specify that there is a "rebuttable
presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest
of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint
physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence."
Daniel G. Saunders, Violence Against Women Online Resources, University of
Minnesota, Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases:
Legal Trends, Research Findings, and Recommendations (1998), at http://www.
vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/custody/custody.htm (internal citation omitted).
217 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-38 (2003).
218 Julie Kunce Field, Visits in Cases Marked by Violence: Judicial Actions
That Can Keep Children and Victims Safe, 35 FAM. CT. REV. 23, 23 (1998).
Moreover, as the author describes, such visits can be lethal to children and non-
offending parents. Id. at 31.
29 Karen Cole, Supervising the Visitation ofAlcoholic Parents, B. & BENCH
VIsrrATIoN REP. (Clearinghouse on Supervised Visitation, Tallahassee, Fla.),
Summer 2002, at 2, http://familyvio.ssw.fsu.edu/b&bspring2002.pdf.
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parent's right to meaningful access to the child, and the child's welfare. 220
Still, not every high-conflict case is suitable for even supervised visitation.
There are some parents who are so dangerous that providing visits creates
too high a risk for the child, the non-offending parent, or the community.22
In addition to giving the courts broad discretion in ordering supervised
222visitation, several states have enacted legislation to facilitate the
development of independent visitation services. As the New Jersey
legislature found, "court[s] often order supervised visitation where there
has been a history of child abuse, medical disabilities, psychiatric problems,
or other situations where the safety and welfare of the child may be
220 Margaret Tortorella, When Supervised Visitation Is in the Best Interests of
the Child, 30 FAM. L.Q. 199,200 (1996); see also Painter v. Painter, 688 A.2d 479,
486-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (finding that former husband's severe verbal
and physical abuse of former wife, son, and daughterjustified supervised visitation
order); In re Marriage of Gocal, 576 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (order
of supervised visitation for father and son for twelve months was not abuse of
discretion where father had undergone hospitalizations for manic and aggressive
episodes); Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71,79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
supervised visitation order for mother was not abuse of discretion, because justified
by mother's animosity and behavior toward father and failure to provide counseling
for daughter who had engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior with a child); In
re Marriage of Burwinkel, 426 N.W.2d, 664, 665 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (father's
spanking of child with excessive force justified supervised visitation);
Hollingsworth v. Semerad, 799 So. 2d 658, 665 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
supervised visitation justified where father was alcoholic and had repeatedly
abused child and stepmother); Street v. May, 803 So. 2d 312, 320 (La. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that mother's substance abuse posed a risk of harm to child
justifying supervised visitation); Meier v. Connelly, 378 N.W.2d 812, 817-19
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring father with history of denying child access to
mother to submit to supervised visitation until he posted $10,000 bond to ensure
return of child from unsupervised visitation); Cox v. Cox, 515 S.E.2d 61, 67 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1999) (supporting lower court's findings that unsupervised visitation
between mother and children was not in children's best interest, and that visits
should be supervised by child psychologist).
221 Peter MacDonald, A View from the Bench, B. & BENCH VISITATION REP.,
Winter 1999, at 4-5, http://familyvio.ssw.fsu.edu/b&bwinterl999.pdf.
222 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-218(2) (providing that "if the court
finds that.., the child's physical health would be endangered or the child's
emotional development significantly impaired, the court may order supervised
visitation"). In Alabama, similarly, if a parent has committed violence, "a court [in
a visitation order] may take any of the following actions: (1) Order an exchange of
the child to occur in a protected setting. (2) Order visitation supervised in a manner
to be determined by the court." ALA. CODE § 30-3-135(b) (2001).
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jeopardized," '223 but that visitation may not occur "due to the inability to
locate volunteers willing to be present during the visitation. 224 The New
Jersey legislation is intended to "mak[e] the facilities and members of local
community organizations available to assist in court ordered, supervised
visitation."'"
Commentators and researchers have noted the rapid development and
growth of United States supervised visitation programs.226 Designed "to
assure that a child can have safe contact with an absent parent without
having to be put in the middle of the parents' conflicts or other
problems,""2 supervised visitation programs supply independent third
parties who are trained and authorized to observe the contact between a
child and a nonresidential parent.22' The institutionalized setting of a
visitation program is often far superior to arrangements allowing a friend
or family member-who may not believe the allegations and fail to protect
the child, or who may be intimidated by the parent and fail to control the
visit adequately--to supervise the visits.
229
Only a few studies have examined supervised visitation and monitored
exchange programs. The programs originated in the 1980s 230 through
22 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:12-7(a) (West 2003).
224 Id. § 2A: 12-7(b).
w Id.
226 See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston & Robert B. Straus, Traumatized Children in
Supervised Visitation: What do They Need?, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV.
135, 135 (1999). Supervised visitation programs may be referred to by several
terms, including "supervised access," see, for example, id. at 135, and "parenting
time centers," MINN. STAT. § 119A.37 (2001).
227 SVN, SUPERVISED VISITATION HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS 3 (2001).
228 See, e.g., KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES, supra note 184, 2.3 (identi-
fying supervised visitation and exchanges); see also Bonnie S. Newton, Visitation
Centers: A Solution Without Critics, 71 FLA. B.J. 54, 56 (1997).
22 "Orders allowing a family member to supervise visitation or visitation
exchanges do not adequately address safety and place the family member at risk of
violence or manipulation by the abuser. Family members are also more likely to
tolerate inappropriate behavior or violations of the visitation order." ABA Comm'n
on Domestic Violence, POLICY OOAI09A (2000), http://www.abanet.org/
domviol/visreccomend.html. Despite this ABA admonition, some states
specifically allow judges to appoint a relative of the nonresidential parent as a
supervisor. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-27-509(d) (2003) ("If a court allows a
family or household member to supervise visitation, the court shall establish
conditions to be followed during visitation."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-
105(b)(i)(B) (Michie 2002) (allowing judges to order visitation to be arranged and
supervised by another person, including family or household members).
230 Peg McCartt Hess, History and Evolution, in NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR
THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN PROFESSIONALS' HANDBOOK ON
[VOL. 92
TOWARD A COHERENT APPROACH
"grassroots organizing and volunteerism '231' and currently exist in many
forms, including non-profit, for-profit, public agencies, and collaborations
between these groups.232 Notwithstanding the dearth of formal empirical
analysis, supervised visitation programs often keep their own statistics.
233
These statistics show that the programs serve an important need: they
provide oversight in disputed cases in which courts decide to err on the side
of protecting the children's--and parents'--safety. A program in Califor-
nia, for example, reported that domestic violence is by far the most
common reason that a parent's contact with a child is supervised.3 Other
reasons include parental substance abuse and allegations of child abuse.235
Monitored exchange programs provide a neutral third party to supervise
the parents delivering the child to and from each other for visits, without
supervising the actual visit, in chronically hostile cases. As the Kansas
Child Exchange and Visitation Center Guidelines state, "The primary
purposes of supervised exchange and visitation centers are to promote the
safety and welfare of the child, parents, and program staff during exchanges
and visits and to promote the safety of a vulnerable parent at
changeovers. 236
When courts order monitored exchanges, they allow parents to avoid
emotional, and sometimes dangerous, confrontations with one another
when they exchange the child after visits. 237 Parents often accuse each other
PROVIDING SUPERVISED VISITATION 11, 20 (Anne Reiniger ed., 2000) [hereinafter
NYSPCC HANDBOOK] (stating that the first programs "were initiated in 1982").
231 Barbara E. Flory et al., Note, An Exploratory Study of Supervised Access
and Custody Exchange Services, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 469, 481 (2001).
232 Nancy Thoennes & Jessica Pearson, Supervised Visitation: A Profile of
Providers, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 460, 474 (1999).
233 Programs are encouraged by the SVN to keep statistics. See SVN,
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR SUPERVISED VISITATION NETwORK PRACTICE §
42 [hereinafter SVN, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES], reprinted in NYSPCC
HANDBOOK, supra note 230, at 125.
234 Rally Family Visitation Services is a "mid-sized program" in San Francisco,
California. It reports referrals for reasons of "domestic violence (71%), children
witnessing domestic abuse (28%), allegations of child abuse (34%), substance
abuse (40%), lack of access (48%), and reintroduction of contact with the visiting
parent (52%)." Nadine Blaschak-Brown, Providing the Service, in NYSPCC
HANDBOOK, supra note 230, at 68.
235 id.
236 KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES, supra note 184, 2.3.
23' This service is viewed as an important court resource. See, e.g., Leigh
Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for
Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 276-77 (1999)
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of violating court orders for visitation by showing up late for the transfer
to purposefully interfere with the other's schedule; not showing up at all;
using the opportunity for contact to cause heated arguments in the presence
of the child; bringing family members and friends to the transfer because
they are suspicious of one another; inflicting physical harm, or threats of
harm, on the other parent; and fabricating false allegations of misbehavior
(e.g., drunkenness) about the other.23 When the court orders monitored
exchange, it can require parents to meet at a neutral site to transfer the child
to and from visits, and to have trained personnel record the time of arrival
and departure of each parent, observe their interaction, and ensure that the
transfer takes place as ordered. This reduces the possibility of parties'
interfering with each other's parental rights, as well as protecting falsely
accused parents, inhibiting verbal and physical altercations, and allowing
a smoother transition for the child.239
Many commentators have advocated the widespread availability of
supervised visitation2 40 and monitored exchange programs for high-conflict
(describing the benefits of supervised visitation in cases of domestic violence and
advocating for the development of such centers in each community); see also Amy
B. Levin, Comment, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: How Should Judges
Apply the Best Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and Visitation Cases
Involving Domestic Violence?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 813, 819 (2000) (calling for
courts "to mandate supervised visitation for batterers and their children so that
children can be safe and batterers can have continuing contact with their children").
238 As Kathryn Marsh notes:
This service is also beneficial when parents are very hostile to each
other and are not reliable reporters of their attendance .... Careful record
keeping is important. Reports of "he said, she said" by conflicted parents
can absorb significant staff time .... It is not unusual for a parent to
arrive under the influence of alcohol or drugs or make a complaint of
marks found on a child during a visit.
Kathryn Marsh, The Services, in NYSPCC HANDBOOK, supra note 230, at 31,
32-33.
9 Id. at 36-37. The state of Oldahoma attempted to deal with allegations of
non-compliance with court ordered visitation by establishing by statute the Child
Visitation Registry Program, which includes a log for each case that must be signed
by each parent at the time of arrival and departure. The entries in the log are
rebuttable presumptive proof of compliance or non-compliance with court-ordered
visitation. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 421 (2002).
240 Supervised visitation is listed in a group of "services that should be
available to all families, without regard to income." Ramsey, supra note 6, at 152;
see also Field, supra note 218, at 31 (arguing that the use of supervised visitation
programs can "help limit the harm domestic violence victims and their children face
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cases.24' Underscoring the crucial role of supervised visitation in dealing
with a domestic violence case, one judge wrote:
[The] goals to be considered are protection of the victim/parent from
physical violence; protection of the victim/parent from verbal-emotional
abuse; protection of the child from physical violence; protection of the
child from verbal-emotional abuse; providing a relationship between the
child and the batterer parent while providing for safety; allowing contact
while parenting skills are developed; allowing contact while treatment is
provided. The availability of supervised visitation is critical to a judge
being able to meet any of these goals.
242
As in the development of the CASA movement, which began when Judge
David Soukup of Seattle, Washington recognized the need for children to
have advocates in court,243 supervised visitation is often spearheaded by
during visits or exchanges"); Newton, supra note 228, at 57 (describing supervised
visitation as a "solution without a downside"). ABA Comm'n on Domestic
Violence, supra note 229, encourages "courts to provide or identify, and make use
of, locations in which supervised visitation and visitation exchanges can safely
occur."
241 Johnston, Building Partnerships, supra note 4, at 478; see also Flory et al.,
supra note 231. Flory, who wrote extensively on the development of Heritage
House, a supervised visitation program in St. Louis, Missouri, offers her own
definition of "high-conflict families."
For this study, families are considered high conflict when one or more of
the following criteria is present: (a) children's opportunity to maintain a
relationship with both parents is precluded by parental behaviors, (b)
ongoing adult interpersonal conflict exposes children to negative
messages and inappropriate role expectations, (c) ongoing interparental
verbal and/or physical conflict exposes children to potential emotional
and/or physical harm, (d) child physical or sexual abuse and /or neglect
is alleged, or (e) domestic violence exposes adult victims to potential
physical harm.
Id. at 469.
242 David Dugan, A View From the Bench, B. & BENCH VIsITATION REP.
(Clearinghouse on Supervised Visitation, Tallahassee, Fla.), Summer 2001, at 2,
3.
243 In 1976, Superior Court Judge David Soukup of Seattle, Washington,
obtained funding to recruit and train community volunteers to assist children in
court. The CASA pilot program was then formed. See Nat'l CASA Ass'n, History
of CASA, at http://www.nationalcasa.org/htm/about.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2003).
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judges who see the link between what a family in crisis needs and how a
new service in the community can respond. In many areas, the court system
works with individuals in the community to initiate the development of new
supervised visitation providers.2' One judge in Florida, for example, was
spurred to action upon hearing news of a murder/suicide in a divorce case
over which he presided."4 A judge in Kentucky said that there was no
freestanding visitation center in his jurisdiction, but he would "do all in
[his] power" to see that one was developed.246 In Illinois, where there are
currently only eight monitored exchange programs, the Chicago Tribune
reported that family advocates and many judges are "pushing for" the
development of more services in the wake of several highly publicized
child deaths in custody cases.
247
244 See Dugan, supra note 242, at 2-3 ("[I]n those communities that do not
have an established program, it would be well worth the court's time to spearhead
the development of a supervised visitation program.").
245 Judge Robert Evans had ordered unsupervised visitation between Daniel
Demmer and his two-year-old daughter Sarah, despite warnings from Demmer's
wife Laura that he had a violent temper and kept a loaded gun. See Greg Dawson,
Jovial Judge Does Some Serious Good, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1997, at D1.
During one of the unsupervised visits, Daniel Demmer called 911 to report his own
suicide before killing himself with his handgun. See Tom Leithauser, Man Shoots
Daughter 4 Times, Calls 911 Before Shooting Himself in Head, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 1996, at D1. When police arrived, they found Sarah, whom he
had shot four times in the chest before turning the gun on himself. Id. Police said
the suicide note indicated that Demmer was upset about the divorce and the amount
of time that he was allowed to spend with his daughter. Id. Judge Evans's response
was to organize county support for what became Orlando's Family Ties Supervised
Visitation and Exchange Program, described as "sort of a de-militarized zone" in
particularly nasty divorces. Dawson, supra. Other supervised visitation programs
have been created in response to an identified community need, such as was
recognized in Huntsville, Alabama. In May 1998, a Community Vision Summit
was held to develop a plan for reducing child abuse and neglect, and Judge Susan
T. Moquin helped start the pilot program called Both Parents Program. The
program was born out of the recognition that children "deserve regular and safe
access to their non-custodial parents, whether they are in foster care . . . or
embroiled in their parents' custody battle." Pam Berry, Message from the
Coordinator, BOTH PARENTS PROGRAM NEWSL. (Family Services Center,
Huntsville, Ala.), June 2000, at 1.
246 MacDonald, supra note 221, at 4 (emphasizing the importance of super-
vised visitation, and recalling comments made at the 1999 Supervised Visitation
Network Conference in Nashua, New Hampshire).
24 7 Amanda Vogt, Making Divorce Less Painful for Parents and Their Kids,
Cm. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2003, at 1.
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The New Mexico state legislature empowered "judicial districts [to]
establish a 'supervised visitation program' by local court rule... [and to
allow the use of those programs] when, in the opinion of the court, the best
interests of the child are served if confrontation or contact between the
parents is to be avoided. 248 In Idaho, the legislature declared that "an
effective response to address the needs of families and children in resolving
[domestic relations] disputes would include... [s]upervised visitation by
trained providers to assure the safety and welfare of children." '249 Tennessee
has authorized its Department of Human Services to "apply for and utilize
any federal grants for the purpose of implementing a pilot project for access
and visitation programs. "250
The Federal Violence Against Women Act of 2000 provided $15
million for the development of supervised visitation pilot programs across
the country. 25' New programs have been developed, and units of govern-
ment have been awarded planning grants to investigate ways of developing
Family advocates and many judges are pushing for more monitored
exchange sites .... They say that the simple act of keeping the parents
apart reduces conflict and eases a child's fear .... The body of Joshua
Gleeson, 3, was found floating in the Des Plaines River near Channahon,
and the body of his sister, Ashley, 5, was recovered the next day. Their
father, Patrick Gleeson, 48, is charged in their shooting deaths, which
allegedly took place during a court-ordered visit. Gleeson issued a
statement saying that his custody battle and visitation disputes with the
children's mother made him depressed. He suggested the children were
now better off. On Oct. 1, Mary Elizabeth Brunson-Waller, 3, was shot
to death by her father .... Mary Elizabeth's parents were entangled in a
custody dispute, and authorities said John Brunson believed he was about
to lose visitation privileges when he killed his daughter as she slept in her
car seat.
Id.
24
8 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-5.1(a) (Michie 2002).
49 IDAHO CODE § 32-1402 (Michie 2001).
205 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-312(b) (2000).
25142 U.S.C. § 10420(a) (2000). The Safe Havens for Children Pilot Program
provides for the awarding of
grants to states, units of local government, and Indian tribal governments
that propose to enter into or expand the scope of existing contracts and
cooperative agreements with public or private nonprofit entities to provide
supervised visitation and safe visitation exchange of children by and
between parents in situations involving domestic violence, child abuse,
sexual assault, or stalking.
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future supervised visitation programs.252 This approach ensures the further
growth of programs across the United States to assist judges in domestic
violence cases. A new request for proposals was issued for 2003, contin-
gent on renewed federal funding.253
Supervised visitation providers, in contrast to CASAs,254 are admon-
ished not to make recommendations to the court;2 5 on the other hand, some
CASAs do supervise visitation.256 Visitation program staff seek to develop
and maintain a "caring environment" to allow children to play with and
spend time with their non-custodial parents.257 As Kathryn Marsh writes in
the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children's Profes-
sionals' Handbook on Providing Supervised Visitation:
Supervised visitation programs can be located in schools, churches,
courthouses, universities, YMCA's and YWCA's, child care agencies,
and even renovated houses. Many programs have limited hours but often
operate on weekends and evenings to accommodate the schedules of
children and parents. Staff may include a program coordinator, full- or
part-time visit supervisors, and security guards. Some programs use
trained volunteers and students (graduate and college level) to supervise
visits .... Security and safety for families and staff are critical compo-
252 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, SAFE
HAVENS: VISITATION AND SAFE EXCHANGE GRANT PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2003
SOLICITATION, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/grants/safehavens03/safehavens
03.txt.
253 Id.
" Federal legislation on the appointment of GALs includes a provision that
among the roles of a GAL is the responsibility to make a recommendation to the
court concerning the best interest of the child. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix)
(2000), amended by Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-36, § 1 14(b)(1)(B)(vii) (2003).
2" Nevertheless, practice often departs from this expectation because of
judicial pressure. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding supervised
visitation providers making recommendations, see Nat Stem & Karen Oehme, The
TroublingAdmission ofSupervised Visitation Records in Custody Proceedings, 75
TEMP. L. REv. 271, 279-80 (2002).
256 See, e.g., West v. Osborne, 34 P.3d 816, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(involving a GAL who supervised visits, among her other duties).
" For a discussion of the various philosophies to be considered when setting
up a visitation program, a prototype of a visitation room, and lists of furnishings,
see Heidi Levenback, Setting Up the Physical Environment, in NYSPCC
HANDBOOK, supra note 230, at 52-57.
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nents of supervised visitation programs in terms of location, staffing, and
program procedures.
258
Supervised visitation and exchange providers are trained in areas such as
child development, divorce dynamics, child abuse and neglect issues, and
administrative procedures. 259 They are fact finders, routinely screening
parents for the presence of substance abuse and violence, reviewing
records, providing intake, documenting whether parents show up for court-
ordered visits, and taking notes regarding the interaction between parent
and child during the visits. 26° Providers also inform parents of program
rules and policies. They frequently intervene in the visit when those rules
are violated,26' redirecting parent-child interaction, admonishing parents
who violate rules, and sometimes terminating visits. 26 2 Their roles require
them to exercise a great deal of"'discretionary judgment' as part of their
function" 263 when determining when and how to intervene. For example,
the Kansas Child Exchange and Visitation Center Guidelines define the
Exchange/Visitation Supervisor as the individual trained and authorized to,
among other things, facilitate the parent-child interaction.264 Facilitation is
defined as "to encourage age-appropriate activities, promote the child's
safety and welfare, and discourage inappropriate conduct., 26 5 Deciding
when a child is at risk and determining what behavior is inappropriate
certainly involve a great deal of discretionary judgment to fulfill the court's
order for supervised contact.
Despite providing such important services, supervised visitation and
exchange programs, like many social services, are chronically under-
258 Marsh, supra note 238, at 35.
259 For a thorough discussion of suggested policies and procedures, see
Blaschak-Brown, supra note 234, at 69-81. The author describes procedures for
intake and screening of parents. See id. at 69-74.
260 For a list of the services these programs provide, see id. at 69-70.
261 SVN, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 233.
262 For a description of intake and services, see Blaschak-Brown, supra note
234, at 69-75.
263 Stone v. Glass, 35 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that
the discretion accorded to a social worker conducting a court-mandated custody
evaluation required that she receive quasi-judicial immunity).
264 See KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES, supra note 184, §§ 2.3-2.4; see
generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-720(a) (2002) (directing Kansas Attorney General
to coordinate and cooperate with local government agencies in providing visitation
centers).
265 See KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES, supra note 184, § 2.4.
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funded.2"6 Thus, many programs must rely on an ever-changing amalgam
of volunteers, paid staff, licensed clinicians, paid community members, and
college interns to monitor visits.26 Like the citizen advocates of the CASA
program, supervised visitation workers are "citizen monitors" charged with
ensuring safe visits for at-risk children.26
Perhaps because supervised visitation is a scarce resource,269 "[U]udicial
referral to supervised access and custody services is often a last resort in a
long line of treatment interventions., 270 Accordingly, supervised visitation
is generally reserved for the most difficult and contentious custody
disputes. 27' Thus, while only a small subgroup of divorcing parents are
considered high-conflict, these cases are much more prevalent at visitation
centers.272
Directors of supervised visitation programs regard high-conflict cases
as dangerous power struggles. According to the director of a visitation
program that was developed specifically for high-conflict cases,
[T]hese are the parents that will fight to the death thinking they can
convince the courts, the kids, and service providers that they are the better
parent. In actuality, they view the children as possessions. If they perceive
a person/service to be in their way, they will "mow you down" in any
266 See, e.g., Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232, at 474; see also Debra A.
Clements, A Compelling Need for Mandated Use of Supervised Visitation
Programs, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 294, 306 (1998) (asserting that
"[t]he demonstrated inability of most supervised visitation programs to endure, let
alone thrive, because of inadequate financial resources provides a compelling
reason for state funding").
267 See Stem & Oehme, supra note 255, at 281. See Katherine M. Reihing,
Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and Their Children After Divorce: The
American Law Institute's Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 393, 404
(1999); see also Clements, supra note 266, at 306 (stating that the chronic need for
funding justifies state funding for programs).268 See Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232, at 460.
269 See, e.g., Reihling, supra note 267, at 404 (criticizing the American Law
Institute's model statute on child custody for suggesting free or low-cost court-
ordered services like supervised visitation for families affected by domestic
violence without acknowledging the costs for developing and providing such
services).
270 Flory et al., supra note 231, at 480.
27 See Stem & Oehme, supra note 255, at 271.
272 Flory et al., supra note 23 1, at 469; Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232,
at 460.
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number of ways. When they perceive bias, they escalate over time and
they will eventually lash out.273
According to various studies, other directors agree.274 Supervised visitation
staff are responsible for creating a supervised environment, and parents can
273 E-mail from Barbara Flory, Project Director, Heritage House, St. Louis,
Mo., to Karen Oehme (July 21, 2002) (on file with authors).
274 There is a paucity of information, as few studies have been done on
supervised visitation and monitored exchange services. The few studies that have
been conducted, however, show that the majority of supervised visitation programs
are either part of private, non-profit social services agencies or linked to public
agencies. See Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232, at 464. In order to determine
whether anecdotal information informally received by the Clearinghouse might be
accurate on a large scale, we circulated an informal survey regarding supervised
visitation services to program directors at the May 2002 Annual Supervised
Visitation Network Conference in Destin, Florida. One hundred and four programs
participated in the conference. Sixty-three programs responded. Of those
responding, forty-nine percent use volunteers to monitor visits; ten percent pay
community members to monitor visits; fifty-seven percent use college interns, who
receive credit, to monitor visits; and fifty-seven percent use paid staff (other than
directors) to monitor visits. (One study found that one half of supervised visitation
programs use graduate and undergraduate volunteers, and that one third to one
fourth of programs use other community members. Id. at 464. It is unclear,
however, whether the student "volunteers" in the study cited by Thoennes &
Pearson also received academic credit for their work; nor it is clear whether those
students were paid during university holidays in which visits took place, or whether
community members were paid nominal hourly wages in any cases. These factors
may make a difference when considering issues of immunity under current law.)
More interesting in our study are responses to the question, "Have you ever been
threatened with a lawsuit by a parent ordered to use your program?" Fifty-five
percent of respondents answered yes. In addition, next to the their affirm-ative
responses to this question, some respondents wrote "daily." The program directors
were then asked a follow-up question, "Has anyone else ever threatened to fie a
lawsuit against your staff or your program?" Forty percent answered in the
affirmative. The final question asked was the following: "Are you concerned that
you, your staff, or your program might get sued by a parent ordered to participate
in your program?" Seventy percent of respondents checked, "Yes, this concerns
me." This informal study may shed some light on the oft-discussed discrepancy
between the fact that relatively few non-profit organizations have actually been
sued, and the concern among many program staffthat they will be sued. The survey
results are on file with the authors.
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easily resent what they may perceive as surveillance.275 Such providers are
just as vulnerable to the "intimidating wrath and litigious penchant of
disgruntled parents ' as CASAs, mediators, and other essential service
providers.
B. Crafting Immunity for Visitation Staff
The staff of supervised visitation programs represent strong candidates
for the immunity we have proposed. The largest study of supervised
visitation programs to date has noted that supervised visitation directors
worry about liability issues.277 The drafters of the Supervised Visitation
Network ("SVN") Standards and Guidelines added a provision mandating
that liability insurance be provided for staff and families utilizing the
services.278 Lawsuits would be a tremendous drain on the resources and
morale of providers. Most supervised visitation staff are presumably not
accustomed to the discovery process associated with lawsuits. Despite the
fact that many supervised visitation counselors or programs must buy
professional liability coverage,279 creating a presumption of immunity
would go a long way toward discouraging frivolous lawsuits filed by angry
parents.
The fact that some communities have initiated the development of
supervised visitation programs to protect their vulnerable children means
that the paid or volunteer status of the programs' staff members may vary
depending on the community's resources. Supervised visitation providers2 °
275 The loss of privacy and exposure of the vulnerability of the parent-child
relationship are two reasons mentioned for the "negative feelings" that parents can
have about programs. Levenback, supra note 257, at 52. One participant called a
visitation program "a jail with carpet." Karen Oehme, Supervised Visitation
Programs in Florida: A Cause for Optimism, A Callfor Caution, 71 FLA. B.J. 50,
54 (1997).
276 Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990) (finding that a
court-appointed GAL for the child had absolute immunity against a claim of
negligence by the child's parents).
277 Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232, at 475-76.
278 SVN, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 233, § 3.3.
279 See FLORIDA VISITATION STANDARDS and KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES,
supra note 184 (requiring liability insurance for supervised visitation programs);
see also SVN, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 233, § 3.3 (requiring that
"[a]ll providers of Supervised Visitation services must provide adequate general
and liability insurance for staff and families utilizing the services").
280 The titles of these workers-whether monitors, coordinators, or staff-are
irrelevant to our discussion.
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may not fit neatly into the boxes of currently existing protection. For
example, only a few providers would be protected by governmental
immunity statutes such as the one in Kansas, which protects only govern-
mental employees for damages resulting from exercising "judicial func-
tion." '' Similarly, many programs' use of at least some volunteers means
only that the Volunteer Protection Act may protect those volunteers from
civil liability when angry parents file suit.28 2 Other personnel, working side
by side with volunteers-like those workers in Palm Beach County,
Florida, who are public school teachers and college students during the
week, and who make $12 per hour working at Family Connection
supervising visits on weekends 2 3-- are cast into a much more vulnerable
area than their volunteer counterparts. Heritage House, located in Missouri,
uses only paid MSW-level supervisors and paid master's level college
students; it never uses volunteers. 2 Children's Safety Centers, which
operates five supervised visitation programs in Minnesota, relies on a
combination of volunteers, paid staff, interns, and college students.28 5 Some
programs provide college credit to students, but must pay them hourly
wages in the summer months, during spring break, and at times when the
university is closed;286 after all, as one program director noted, "even
dysfunctional parents want to visit with their children during holidays. 28 7
Under our model, to determine the appropriate scope of immunity to be
accorded to supervised visitation workers, a court should apply the
statutory factors that we have proposed.288 The providers who accept
281 See Cook v. City of Topeka, 654 P.2d 953,956 (Kan. 1982) (construing the
immunity for the "judicial function" provided in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(b)
(2001) as protecting only the performance of functions involving "the exercise of
judgment, discernment, or discretion" (internal citation omitted)).
282 See supra notes 169-75.
283 E-mail from Mary Jaffe, Case Manager, Family Connection, to Karen
Oehme (Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with authors). Family Connections runs its
visitation program in the cafeteria of the Palm Beach County Courthouse. It
frequently advertises for volunteers, but also pays teachers, college students, and
community mental health professionals to monitor visits on weekends.
284 E-mail from Barbara Flory, Project Director, Heritage House, to Karen
Oehme (Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with authors).
285 E-mail from Amber Blackmon, Volunteer Coordinator, Children's Safety
Centers, to Karen Oehme (Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with authors).
286 E-mail from Susan Marvin, Director of the Family Visitation Program of
Tallahassee, to Karen Oehme (Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with authors).
28
7 id.
288 See supra Part III.B.
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judicially referred cases obviously meet the primary criterion of judicial
authority; a child's presence in the program must be directly attributable to
a court order. Likewise, it is the very essence of a visitation program that
staff avoid conflicts of interest and a personal stake in the outcome of the
case. The "ability to maintain an independent role" ' 9 is an important
criterion for staff selection of supervised visitation providers. Indeed,
commentators frequently mention the importance of neutrality, emphasizing
that supervised visitation "staff members appear in court as neutral fact
witnesses rather than biased expert witnesses promoting one parent over the
other."'290
Somewhat more doubtful, however, is whether widely recognized
practice standards for visitation staff have materialized with sufficient
clarity to justify immunity. No national body has promulgated a definitive
code governing supervised visitation staff conduct. On the other hand, the
multinational nonprofit SVN 91 promulgated a set of standards and
guidelines for the provision of supervised visitation in 1996. These are
currently under revision, and no state has yet adopted them in full.
Several states, however, have adopted standards similar to those of
SVN in defining the tasks of supervised visitation providers, coordinating
the provision of those services, and setting standards for the services.292
Admittedly, only a few other states have even marginally addressed the
issue of independent supervised visitation providers.293 Yet, their develop-
289 SVN, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 233, § 10.3.
29 Flory et al., supra note 23 1, at 474.
291 SVN, About Supervised Visitation Network, at http://www.svnetwork.net/
AboutSVN.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
292 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3200 (West 2003) (directing Judicial Council
to develop uniform standards of practice for providers of supervised visitation, as
found in CAL. RULES OFCT., STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 26.2 (2002)); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-720(a) (2002) (directing Kansas Attorney General to "coordinate
and cooperate with local governmental agencies in providing the child exchange
and visitation centers"); FLORIDA VISITATION STANDARDS, supra note 184.
293 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10.5-104 (2002) (authorizing development
of a "parenting time enforcement program"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a- 10 11
(West 2003) (authorizing Commissioner of Children and Families to establish
visitation centers); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(14) (2002) (stating that a super-
vised visitation center must provide a secure setting and specialized procedures
for supervised visitation and the transfer of children for visitation and pro-
vide supervision by a person trained in security and the avoidance of family
violence).
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ment and use by the judiciary have far outpaced legislatures' attention to
them.
294
From the few formal studies that exist regarding the service, 295 it is
clear that judges want supervised visitation providers in their communities.
As one study revealed,
Family court judges . . . say they need more supervised visitation
resources. Although many (30%) use family and friends to do the
supervision, most (75%) express skepticism about the suitability of such
arrangements. And although judges in our survey estimated that super-
vised visitation was ordered in less than 5% of divorce filings in their
jurisdictions, a majority (60%) felt that such services are needed in at least
twice as many cases. Most (80%) family court judges and administrators
characterize the lack of services as a "moderate" or "serious" problem for
the courts.
29 6
Ultimately, each state must develop its own standards, 29 7 make its own
evaluation as to the adequacy of those standards, and periodically adjust
that assessment in light of the continued development of supervised visita-
tion. These standards would form the basis for judging the actions of pro-
viders when the providers are faced with tort claims of litigious parents.
In our view, at least two states--California and Kansas-have created
sufficient norms for the provision of supervised visitation services to justify
the extension of at least some tort immunity to providers. 298 We contend
that although other states may have developed a critical mass of service
294 Arizona, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Oklahoma,
Vermont, and Georgia, for example, have not addressed supervised visitation
providers legislatively, but SVN lists programs offering services in each of those
states. For a state-by-state directory, contact Supervised Visitation Network, 2804
Paran Pointe Drive, Cookeville, TN 38506, 931-537-3414; fax 931-537-6348;
Info@SVNetwork.net (on file with authors).
295 See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes. Supervised Visitation: The
Families and Their Experiences, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 123 (2000);
Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232.
296 Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 232, at 473.
297 In Florida, for example, the Family Supreme Court's Family Court Steering
Committee developed minimum standards for the provision of supervised visitation
services. These were ultimately adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. See
FLORIDA VISITATION STANDARDS, supra note 184.
298 See CAL. RULES OF COURT, STANDARDS OFJUDICIAL ADMIN. § 26.2 (2002);
KANSAS VISITATION GUIDELINES, supra note 184.
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standards based on the custom of service delivery, or informally agreed-
upon standards, the development of recognized formal minimum standards
is necessary for the extension of legislative tort immunity. It may well be
that in particular cases, courts will decide to extend immunity to providers
who follow accepted community standards, but we think the better
approach is to provide statutory immunity based on sound formal standards.
As to the scope of possible immunity, the range of potential allegations
against visitation providers precludes a single form of immunity for all
suits. At a minimum, however, all staff in states with formal minimum
conduct standards should receive immunity against allegations of negli-
gence, and in many cases they should enjoy stronger evidentiary protection
as well. Visitation staff who are unpaid volunteers may already be immune
from suit under the VPA;2 99 the meager compensation for many other
workers, however, would leave them vulnerable to liability. This gap in
protection is not justified by the modest salary these workers receive. Far
from being a "cash cow," supervised visitation is viewed by the SVN as a
service that "should be available to all who need it. Within the limits of
available funding, the Provider shall make services available to all families
regardless of ability to pay."3 ' Even for salaried program directors, the
possibility of broader immunity should be addressed.
A more fluctuating variable shaping immunity is the nature of the claim
brought by the complaining parent. Here, two factors that we proposed
above, the severity of the harm and the objectivity of the duty, could be
expected to come into play. As generalizations, for example, serious
physical injury to the child would favor limiting immunity to a claim of
simple negligence, whereas a parent's contention that the parent had
suffered intangible damage would suggest that immunity should apply in
claims of both simple and gross negligence. Thus, a parent charging that the
program's inadequate supervision had caused her child to suffer fractured
limbs would presumably confront a less expansive immunity than one who
alleged harm to her reputation by a defamatory statement in a visitation
report. Between these two extremes, of course, lie more problematic
claims: e.g., failure of custodial duty in releasing a child to a parent
displaying signs of inebriation, or assault and battery in restraining a parent
from engaging in what a staff member regards as inappropriate behavior.
Once a regime of statutory immunity is in place, these are the kinds of
299 Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2003). For a
discussion of the VPA, see supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
30 SVN, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 233, § 9.1.
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issues that courts could explore in the course of developing more general
doctrines of immunity in the area.
We consider it a positive step that the governing bodies of some states
have begun to address independent supervised visitation. In many states,
however, there seems to be a chasm separating lawmakers from those
communities in which supervised visitation programs are developing at a
rapid pace. Lawmakers should not wait until a crisis occurs in which
"citizen monitors" refuse to work at supervised visitation centers for fear
of lawsuits by high-conflict parents. After only one or two of these suits,
particularly if the suits are publicized, judges and communities could well
lose an important ally in the struggle to provide safe havens for children in
the court system. This worry is not an overreaction. This Article's footnotes
are replete with cases in which parents sued neutral individuals engaged by
the court to assist with determining and acting in children's best interest.
Supervised visitation programs exist, and the courts are using them. It is
difficult to determine how many providers the courts are using, but SVN
lists nearly 700 individuals in its voluntary association.301 Legislatures
should now consider setting standards for visitation programs and granting
immunity for their providers.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures should support the invaluable work done by those who
assist the courts in addressing the problems in high-conflict families. Our
society can show its commitment to children by crafting legislation to
protect those who perform this crucial task. Increasingly, in these days of
reduced funding and lean budgets, courts need services staffed by trained
volunteers, community professionals, and even college interns. These
personnel perform crucial work and deserve some measure of protection
from the often spurious, vindictive lawsuits filed by angry parents.
We recognize that our proposal of presumptive tort immunity for a
range of service providers in high-conflict custody cases entails consider-
able extension of existing doctrine. Even if legislatures do not adopt this
version of immunity, however, legislative consideration of the issue may
spur greater recognition of the importance of these services. Perhaps some
legislatures might experiment with a more limited immunity, combined
with increased allocation of resources to judicially mandated family court
301 SVN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (2002)
(on file with authors).
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services. Moreover, by tying immunity to the presence of practice norms,
legislatures could promote the salutary trend toward higher standards of
training and expectations for these services. Either development would
advance the purpose of our proposal: not adoption of immunity as an end
in itself, but rather enhancement of the care of some of society's most
fragile children.
